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ABSTRACT
A PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD OCEAN MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY:
AS AN ALTERNATIVE OCEAN REGIME TO MEET THE
CHALLENGE OF THE MANAGEMENT AND
UTILIZATION OF COLLECTIVE
OCEAN ACTIVITIES
By

SIMON W. TACHE
The oceans may be an alternative source of resource
supply offering the opportunity for extensive practical uses.
A number of ocean systems have been instituted to manage
the exploitation of ocean resources including the practice
of states to negotiate and enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements on a variety of ocean activities; but the
complexities as well as the tendence of some of these ocean
uses to generate extraterritorial effects, accentuate the
need for a global response to alleviate these problems.
Isolated individual national regulations and standards lack
international uniformity to ensure adequate and rational
utilization of the oceans and their resources.

Adhernence

to the traditional interpretation of sovereignty by some
nations is an obstacle to the implementation of 't ruly in:'"
ternational standards and a reasonable limitation should be
placed on the traditional concept of sovereignty with regards to those ocean activities identified as causing or
capable of causing transnational problems.

ii
This study establishes and recognizes the inability
of existing ocean regimes to provide uniform international
standards and proposes as an alternative a comprehensive
international ocean management machinery in the form of a
World Ocean Management Authority (WOMA).

iii
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FOREWARD

The following analysis of ocean regimes will conclude with a proposal for a World Ocean Management
Authority.

Many may consider it idealistic, or even

radical, since it is such a dramatic step from existing
ocean management efforts.
However, I believe that the concept of collective
sovereignty in ocean management is a logical extension
of Ambassador Arviel Pardo's argument that the deep
seabed and its minerals are the "common heritage of
mankind."
The ideas expressed in this work are entirely
those of the author.

Acceptance of this thesis as a

scholarly work by the University of Rhode Island does
not imply an endorsement of the proposals contained
herein.
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INTRODUCTION
The world's resources have come under intensive pressure following the unprecedented increase in world population and the number of independent nations over the past
twenty years, accelerated technological advances, and the
relentless efforts by states to reaffirm political integrity.
Apparently, the land's capacity to sustain these pressures
has dwindled, creating the seward jurisdictional exodus.
President Truman's proclamation of the U.S.A.'s control over the natural resources of its continental shelfl
was followed by similar but occasionally conflicting claims
by other nations.

Unfortunately, the wave of national claims

over the oceans and their resources poses imminent danger of
confrontation.

Today 129 nations exercise various forms of

jurisdictions and standards and inconsistent ones would
tend to engender conflicting ocean policies.

Conflict is

defined here as that condition generated by opposing interests due to divergence of individual interpretation of
events.

As individual states attempt to translate these

interpretations into policies their course of action will
be determined by motivation.
Individual national regulations, rules and

IUS Gov't, 10 Fed. Register 12303, 13 Dept of State
Bulletin 485, 1945, often referred to as Proclamation 2667
of Sept. 28, 1945.
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jurisdictional assertions over joint ocean resources are
inadequate, inherently inconsistent and lack uniform international standards to ensure rational utilization.
~n

A case

point is the 200 mile economic zone claim which some

states consider as territorial waters, others as high seas
and a third group as sui generis, that is neither territorial waters nor high seas.

Attempts at UNCLOS III to re-

solve the problem may be difficult.

A uniform international

standard is an authoritative model for guidance to the conduct of nations and applicable prima facie to specified
activities.

An exercise of multiple standards by states will

result in exclusionary practices in the use of the oceans.
A proposal for a new ocean regime is expressed in
some 303 draft Articles and 7 Annexes in the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)2 limiting states' jurisdictions and sovereign rights, and establishing an InternaI
tional Seabed Authority.

The regime, however, does not deal

adequately with the establishment of either uniform jurisdictions or international uniform standards for ocean uses.
Attempts to manage and protect the oceans and their
resources through bilateral and multilateral agreements
have also had very little success in developing uniformity
in the practice of states.

These international agreements

2Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Informal Composite Negotiatin, Text, A/CONF.62/WP.IO/Corr.l,
New York: May 23-July 15, 197. Hereafter referred to as
ICNT .
.............

3
are usually not provided the authority necessary to require
states' compliance to formulated standards and regulations
especially when there is a conflict of interest involved.
Regional arrangements too, are subject to political instability.
This study will attempt to document the problem and
establish the necessity of devising an international ocean
mechanism to impose a fixed limit to all extraterritorial
extensions.

This new regime would initiate, define and set

up uniform international standards for ocean activities of
collective concern. 3

An alternative this study will propose

is the creation of a World Ocean Management Authority (WOMA)
which could possibly serve as a basis for such a system.
As is often the case with international arrangements,
political, social, economic and idealogical entanglements
might render the realization of such an authority difficult.
Again, current efforts to create an International Seabed
Authority justify this claim.

Today, many new states have

acceded to independence and the desire of these so called
Third World nations to participate in the shaping of world
events has given the arena of international politics a new
flavor.

To further emphasize this shift in world politics

these nations have in recent years adopted an international
strategy of solidarity, in their dealings with developed
nations.
3An activity is of collective concern if it can cause
or is capable of ceasing extraterritorial, management, environmental or distributional effects.
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Various forms of economic systems proliferate in the
international community, usually variations of free enterprise and planned economies, creating disequilibriums which
are further amplified by the disparity between poor and
rich, developed and developing nations.

Related to this

economic disparity is the social construct of nations.

The

social behavior of people differs from state to state and
even within regions of the same state.

The social structure

of a country is reflected in its political system, economic
development options and ideological alignment.

In addi-

tion, conflicting ideologies have led to bloc orientation
with democracy and socialism emerging as two giant magnets
between which oscillate the non-aligned nations.

All of the

above factors will undoubtedly affect the translation into
social reality of an international ocean management
authority as the one proposed in this stUdy.
The procedural approach used in this study that culminated in the design of WOMA included:
- an investigation of the world's oceans and their
resources
- an exploration of significant ocean uses
a survey of the composition of the world marine
political geography
- an examination of various states' jurisdictional
claims
- an analysis of existing and alternative ocean
regimes
The proposed system is based upon the following
assumptions:

5
- All nations, whether members or non-members, shall
in their interrelations act in conformity with
peaceful principles "in order to pre$erve international peace, security and justice." 4
- The concept of sovereignty exercised on land should
be transformed into collective sovereignty with regards to collective ocean affairs.
- All national claims over the oceans s~ould be
limited to 321.8 km. or 200 nautical miles from the
baseline consistent with the economic zone concept.
- A global management system for collective activities
may be the laternative that is capable of adverting
the "tragedy of the commons"5 and mitigating conflicts.
The protection of the marine environment cannot and
should not be left to the discretion of individual
states.
Conformity of states' practices and rights to uniform international standards and environmentalism
is desirable to ensure adequate enforcement of
WOMA's provisions.

An ocean management system must examine and co-

ordinate the intricate symbiosis of collective
ocean uses, rational states' practicgs and flexibility to be reliable and effective.

WOMA would be internationally instituted and an Ocean
Constitution would elaborate the source and nature of its
power and its potential growth.

The Authority would not

4US Department of State, Publications 2353, on the
Charter of the United Nations, p. 1120, Conference Series,
74, California: June 26, 1945.
5Hardin, Garrett. "Tragedy of the Commons: Adaptation of Address, June 25, 1968," Science 162 (Dec. 13,
1968): 143.
6An activity is reasonable or rational when consistent with uniform international standards. Environmentalism
is the advocation and application of environmental considerations to marine related activities.
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infringe on states' rights within 200 nautical miles consistent with international law, but would exercise full
power over:
- the establishment of uniform standards for collective ocean uses
- the interpretation and development of ocean
treaties for these uses
- the coordination of collective activities (e.g.,
marine pollution, ship design, etc.)
the administration of activities in the area beyond the economic zone.
The Authority would have an Ocean Congress consisting
of an Assembly and a Conciliar.

Representation in the As-

sembly is open to all independent states, while the Conciliar, the highest functional body, would have one representative from each of the following regions:
1.

Africa

2.

Asia

3.

Central and South America

4.

Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

5.

Middle-East

6.

North America

7.

Oceania

8.

Western Europe

9.

World Ocean Deepsea Council (by International
Seabed Authority)

The executive functions of the Authority would be
carried out by seven councils, namely:
1.

World Ocean Deepsea Council (WODSEAC)

7
2.

World Ocean Fisheries Council (WOFIC)

3.

World Ocean Scientific and Environmental
Council (WOSEC)

4.

World Ocean Management Affairs Council (WOMAC)

5.

World Ocean Technology and Economic Council (WOTEe)

6.

World OceanNavi~ation and Transportation
Council (WONTRAC)

7.

World Ocean Disputes Settlement Council (WODISEC)

Current marine related treaties, rules, regulations,
standards and organizationswould be identified, integrated
and classified as appropriate within the jurisdiction of
each council.
Establishment of uniform international standards by
the Authority is desirable to protect the marine environment
and shipping interests of all nations; to facilitate resource management and utilization; to elevate the law's
capability to the level of technological advances; to promote the activities of marine scientific research; to provide
for equitable distribution of and contribution to international marine obligations and to offer international uniform marine standards that are applicable, available and
effective.

PART ONE

OCEAN MANAGEMENT REGIMES

8

CHAPTER 1:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONAL JURISDICTIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS

The Oceans
In considering the various efforts made at both national and international levels to develop effective
ocean management s¥stems, the area of concern must be delineated and its importance emphasized to ascertain and
appraise the problems involved.

The land's supply of re-

sources is limited, cannot match the rate of world's consumption, and has contributed to the current invasion of the
oceans in an unprecedented magnitude.
The oceans cover approximately 384.6 million sq. km. 7
distributed as follows: Antarctic, 14 million sq. km.,
Arctic, 9.6 million sq. km., Atlantic, 107 million sq. km.,
Indian, 74 million sq. km., and Pacific, 180 million sq. km.
The Antarctic and Arctic Oceans will be designated "Axis
Waters" in this study since they lie at the south and north
poles respectively and when connected by an imaginary line
establish the rotationary axis of the earth.

The oceans are

depicted in Fig. 1.
Incorporated into this area of concern is an ocean
belt known as marginal seas.

These areas fall within the

7Compiled by this writer from David Ross, Introduction
to Oceanography, New York: Meredith Corporation, 1970; W.A.
Anikouchine and R.W. Sternberg, The World Ocean, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall Inc., 1973 and Robert Barton, Atlas of the Sea,
New York: The John Dayton Co., 1974.
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jurisdiction of coastal states with the emergence of the
concept of 200 nautical miles economic zones.

In an ef-

fort to promote the development of uniform international
ocean standards, I have redefined marginal seas in a manner
to advocate greater interstate cooperation.
Marginal Seas
Although marginal seas are traditionally defined
simply as seas connected individually to a larger body of
water,8 I shall modify the definition as follows:

Marginal

Seas are seas individually connected to a larger body of
water, or group of seas that constitute a unit discharging
their water into a larger body of water and contiguous to
more than one nation.

The following are classified as Mar-

ginal Seas under this definition:
1. Persian Gulf
2. Red Sea

3. Mediterranean Sea, includes the Black Sea
4. North Sea, includes the Baltic
5. Arctic Bays Sea, includes area between Canada
and Greenland

6. Central American Sea, covers the Gulf and
Caribbean

7. Bering Sea
8. Far Eastern Sea, includes East China, Yellow,
Japan and Okhotsk

9. Southwestern Pacific Sea, includes South China
and Malay Archipelago.

The Marginal Seas are represented in Fig. 2.
8Ross, Introduction to Oceanography, p. 295.
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In addition to their immense size, the oceans are a
resource depository, containing both living and non-living
resources.

The oceans offer the potential for almost un-

limited supply of water, energy and minerals.

However, the

constant motion of the oceans create jurisdictional overlaps and use complexity.

Since ocean activities are inter-

related and complex, I have limited this study to those
uses that by their nature possess an element of commonality
to the world community.
Of particular concern are common pool activities which
can be conducted to maximum capacity, carry a price imposed
by common consent or necessity and cannot be excluded from
any potential participant.

These common pool activities can

be considered to be of collective concern to the world community.

An activity is of collective concern if it can

cause or is capable of causing transnational effects.

Such

activities include seabed exploitation beyond national jurisdictions, marine transportation, fisheries conservation,
scientific research and pollution.

In this study, ocean

regimes will be examined in relation to these activities. 9
An ocean regime is a body of uniform rules, regula-

tions, jurisdictions, practices and standards developed to
promote the rational utilization of the oceans.
gimes have taken three forms:

Ocean re-

national, international and

9These activities are outlined in Appendix A and
defined in supra, note 3.

11
regional arrangements.

However, with or without a regime,

the actual practices of states has been the most important
factor.

The present status of these regimes in relation to

activities of collective concern will now be explored.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the national approach, the regulation of activities
is determined by the individual states.

Historically, the

practices of states in relation to these ocean activities
have been influenced by the concept of the freedom of the
high seas and sovereign control of adjacent coastal waters.
In 1603, the protracted conflict between the Netherlands
and Portugal reached its peak when Jacob Heemskerch of the
Dutch East Indies Company seized the ship Carack Catherine
on behalf of the Dutch government.

Following a lengthy

legal process, the seizure was sanctioned and the proceeds
awarded to the company on September 9, 1604. 10
Serious doubts nevertheless persisted concerning the
legality and validity of that decision.

In order to defend

the award, Grotius was retained by the Dutch East Indies
Company.

He wrote the commentary on the "law of price and

booty" which he later expanded to include the concept of
"mare liberum," that is, freedom of the seas .11

The con-

cept of freedom of the seas is based on the position that
10Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres,
translated by Francis W. Kelsey, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1925, p. 12.
llIbid., p. 213.

12
the oceans constitute the property of no one or "res
nullius" and therefore cannot or should not be occupied
since they are a common pool resource or "res communis."
This concept was opposed by John Selden in 1635 who
endeavored to demonstrate that nations such as Britain and
Italy had effectively appropriated portions of the oceans
through the exercise of sovereign powers.

Sovereign con-

trol over the sea is based upon the direct relationship
that exists between the land territory and the adjacent
waters and the argument that the "res nullius" character of
the oceans opens them to appropriation by anyone.

Selden

concluded with the concept of "mare clausum," that is,
closed se•. 12 As mentioned earlier, these two concepts continue to affect national ocean activities and policies with
regard to resource and non-resource use.
Resource
Exploitation and conservation of fisheries have been
of great concern to states since it became custom for
nations to extend their jurisdiction over adjacent coastal
waters.

On May 5, 1871, Sweden reserved fishing rights on

the west coast of the Kingdom exclusively for its residents. 1 3 Colombia also reserved fishing rights in its

12Gary Knight, Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents and
Readings, 1976-1977 ed., Washington, D.C.: Nautilus Press,
1976, p. 36.
13Royal Order No. 21 of May 5, 1871, UN Legislative
Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6, p. 563.
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territorial sea to the nationals .of the state in 1914, declared fisheries a source of revenue and provided specifica14
·
.
specles.
t ion as t 0 th e h arves t 0 f submarlne
On March 28, 1936, Cuba promulgated the legislative
Decree No. 704 as a general Act relating to fishing and declared exclusive control over fishing activities within
three miles of the coastline.

The United States of America's

Sockeye Salmon Fishery Act of July 29, 1947, a result of an
agreement between that nation and Canada, prohibited the harvest, transport and distribution of the Sockeye Salmon in
contravention to the Act.

Following the May 20, 1964 Act

prohibiting foreign fishing vessels in the territorial waters
of the USA, this nation enacted the October 14, 1966 Act establishing a Fisheries Zone Contiguous to its Territorial
Sea within which exclusive fishing rights are reserved unless
specified otherwise. 15
Related to resources are the continental shelf claims.
In 1945, the USA proclaimed jurisdictional control over the
natural resources of its continental shelf. 16 Brazil,
Ecuador and Pakistan made similar claims in 1950 and India
in 1955.

In contrast, however, the Brazilian continental

14Law No. 58 of 3 November 1914, Art. 1. ST/LEG/SER.
B/15, p. 615.
15 The Cuban and USA Acts appear in ST/LEG/SER.B/15,
p. 61, and 692. Also for the US Act, US 80 Stat. 908,
Oct. 14, 1966.
16 US Department of State, Bulletin of State 13 (1945),
supra note 1.
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shelf was declared to be an integral part of the national
territory and the use and exploitation of resources under
exclusive dominion control. 17

Venezula went a step further

when in 1956, it declared that "Venezuela shall own and
have sovereignty" over its continental shelf. 18
Non-Resource
The regulation of shipping involves the exercise of
jurisdictional control over flag vessels, vessels of other
states in transit through territorial waters, safety, navigation on the high seas and the internal affairs on board
ships.

Admirali ty law, "a corpus of rules, concepts, and

legal practices governing certain centrally important concerns of the business of carrying goods and passengers by
water, ,,19 is the instrument through which shipping is regulated.

Its origin can be traced to the Rhodesian law dating

about 900 B.C., Tablets of Amafi near Naples, Libre del
Consolat de Mar of Barcelona, laws of Wisby, the Hansa Towns
and the rules of 01eron. 20 In Britain, as early as 1400 A.D.,

17Decree No. 28.840 of 8 November 1950, ST/LEG/SER.
B/15, p. 338.
18Ibid., p. 472, Act of July 1956 Concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Fishery Protection and
Air-Space.
19Grant Gilmore & Charles Black, Jr. The Law of Admiralty. New York: Foundation Press, 1957, p. 1.
20 Ni cholas J. Healey & David J. Sharpe, Admiraltr:
Cases & Materials. St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co , , 197 ,
p. 3.

•
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Admiralty law

wa~ ~ell

established, limiting Admiralty Court

jurisdiction to things "done upon the sea.,,21
Following the American Revolution, admiralty jurisdiction was placed within the federal judicial power, to be
implemented by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 22

Other nations

enacted national legislation to regulate shipping.

In

Sweden, the registration of ships was conferred to vessels
with two-thirds assets owned by Swedish citizens or a
joint-stock company in 1891.

Norway extended its 1902

General Penal Code to apply to Norwegian vessels on the high
seas. 23
The Canadian Shipping Act of 1934, which elaborated on
the conduct of stranded vessels and the right to detain
foreign ships causing damage to Canadian property in any part
of the world was amended in 1952 to become the Admiralty Act.
This act subjects vessels and offenses committed by persons
in the internal and territorial waters to the Canadian jurisdiction, irrespective of nationality.

In a similar pattern,

Ireland in 1964 amended its 1959 Maritime Jurisdiction Act
to cover offenses committed within its inland and territorial waters. 24

21Gilmore, The Law of Admiralty, p. 9.
22U.S. Government, 1 Stat. · 76, (1789).
23UN Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, p. 563 and
176.
24 I bi d., p. 153 and 90.
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Connected to maritime law is custom zones.

The USA's

National Prohibition Act, which produced the necessity for
the treaty between the USA and Great Britain for the prevention of smuggling intoxicating liquor 25 certainly is the
origin of custom zones.

In 1927 Canada promulgated its

Custom Act, amended in 1952, which authorizes the seizure
of vessels of Canadian registry violating custom regulations
within twelve miles from the coastline.
In 1924, the USA initiated and enacted the Oil Pollution Act for the control of pollution of the marine environment by oil although the scope of the law was limited
to discharge by vessels within navigable waters.

New

Zealand promulgated the Petroleum Regulation Act of March
15, 1939 prohibiting the disposal of waste oil, salt water
and refuse except in the proper receptacles.

Similarly,

the United Kingdom enacted the Oil in Navigable Waters Act
in 1955 to ban the discharge of mixtures containing more
than 1/100 parts of oil in a million parts into the navigable waters. 26
The transition of some of these national practices
into Customary International Law and the threat of possible
unilateral actions of states and collective acts of states
on fiscal and custom affairs convinced nations including the
25Convention Between the United States and Great
Britain for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors,
January 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761;USTS 685.
26UN Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/15, p. 289, 286,
and 288.
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USA and the UK that the isolated national approach should
be improved through greater inter-state cooperation and
through the codification of the Law of the Sea.
Law of the Sea
The first major attempt to develop an international
ocean regime began in 1930 at the Hague Conference for
Codification of International Law. 27 Although no agreement
was reached, it laid the foundation for subsequent conferences.

The First Law of the Sea Conference took place in

Geneva in 1958 during which four treaties were concluded
despite disagreement on such a basic issue as the breadth of
the territorial waters.
The treaties were the Convention of Territorial Seas
and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas, and the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas. 28 Recognizing that agreement had not been reached on
fundamental issues, the delegates adopted a

resolu~ion

nn

April 27, 1958 to request the United Nations General Assembly
to explore the feasibility of convening a second Conference
27Conference for the Codification of International
Law, the Hague, March 13, 1930, American Journal of International Law, Supp. 24 (1930) pp. 239-268.
28Law of the Sea Conference Final Act, UN Doc.
A/Conf.13/L52, April 26, 1958
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of the Law of the Sea to resolve these questions. 29
The 1960 Conference failed to adopt either a flexible
territorial limit of 3-12 miles or a 12 miles fishing zone.
In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly called for a
Third Law of the Sea Conference to formulate international
conventions that would govern the utilization of the
oceans. 30 In 1974 that Conference was held in Caracas with
the hope to settle unresolved issues of previous conferences and possibly conclude a comprehensive ocean treaty.
Realizing that the issues could not be resolved at a single
conference, the delegates decided to keep alive the negotiating process of the Law of the Sea. 31 This. decision
culminated in the present chain of negotiations at the
United Nations, the product of which is the ICNT.32
The 1958 Convention and subsequent conferences of the
Law of the Sea have resulted in the establishment of jurisdictional zones within which certain activities of states
are regulated.

The practices of states with regards to the

exploitation, conservation and protection of the marine

29UN, "The Law of the Sea Convention," roC.A/CONF.
13/L56(VIII) April 27, 1958.
30UN, roc A/802B (1970), General Assembly Res.
2750(L) XXV, 25 UN, GAOR Supp. 28, p. 26.
3111General Assembly Adopts Resolution for Conference
on Law of the Sea," 69 Dept. of State Bulletin, 747 (1973).
32UN, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, New York:
1977, supra note 2.
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ecosystem and the exercise of jurisdictional control within
these zones will now be examined.
Jurisdictional Zones
Baseline
The baseline is the "low-water line along the coast as
marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal state. ,,33

Where the ooast is rugged, deeply in-

dented, or marked by islands, straight adjoining lines may
be employed to "mark straight baselines. ,,34

The application

of the straight baselines is a method that hinges on special
characteristics of the coast line.
The first and most effective application of the
straight baselines system to determine the extension of the
territorial waters resulted from the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
case. 35

The United Kingdom had maintained that seizure

of its fishing vessels within areas four miles off the coast
of Norway by that nation was an illegal act since those
waters constitute part of the high seas.

At the time

Britain recognized only territorial waters of three miles

33Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zane, Art. 3 516 U.N.T.S.205, 15 U.S.T.1606,
T. I . A. S . 5639 .
34~., Art. 4.

35United Kingdom v. Norway, I.C.J. Reports (1951)
reproduced in 46 American Journal of International Law,
(1952) p. 348-370.
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as being legal. 36

The Court held that the use of the

straight baselines by Norway to delimit the outer extension
of its territorial waters was acceptable, given the geographical peculiarity of the coast and the fact that the
general direction of the coast was followed.
Internal Waters
Internal waters are enclosed by the baseline.

Whereas

states have complete sovereignty over these waters, the
nature of the marine ecological structure and the extraterritorial problems that may result f'rom scsie uses must be
recognized.

For example, in 1909 the USA and Canada signed

a treaty prohibiting the pollution of their waters causing
injury to the health or property of either party.37

Fumes

from a smelting plant in British Columbia, Canada contaminated and damaged property in the State of Washington, USA.
The latter brought the case before the International Joint
Commission in 1928 and to arbitration in 1935, having rejected the Commission's decision.

In March 1941, the Ar-

bitration Board awarded the claim of the USA.

The ration-

ale was that under the principles of international law, no
state may use or permit the use of its territory to cause
injury to the territory of another state and also that states

36H.S. Kent, "The Historical Origins of the ThreeMile Limit," 48 American Journal of International Law,
(1952) p. 539.
37A.P. Lester, "River Pollution in International Law,"
51 American Journal of International Law, (1963), p. 828.
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were responsible for the activities conducted in their terri tories. 38

Of significance is the .de sf.gnat.Lcn.' of internal

waters by states as part of their territory.

Adjacent to

these waters are territorial waters.
Territorial Waters
The IeNT is desttned to play an important role in the
development of customary law of the sea, the fate of the
Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, notwithstanding.

Thus,

while there has been no agreement on the breadth of the
territorial sea at previous conferences, 69 nations as of
1978 had territorial waters claims of 12 miles, the greatest
number of states claiming any new single limit. 39

States

have rights over airspace, waters, subsoil and security of
the territorial waters; and the responsibility to publicize
dangers to navigation and not to discriminate or hamper
innocent passage. 40
The most well documented and publicized case occurring
in territorial waters was the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries
conflict.

From 1901 to 1951, both Iceland and Britain had

territorial waters limit of three miles.

Both nations de-

pended heavily on the fishing grounds around Iceland.

The

38 I bi d., p. 850.
39These nations are listed in Appendix B on National
Claims.
40Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the co,:,stal state.
Convention on the 'Ter r i t or i al Sea and the Contlguous Zone,
Art. 14.
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fisheries catch from these traditional grounds provided
80% of Icelandic exports and constituted 25% of the catch of
the British fleet, occupying 50% of its distant water
fleet. 41 In 1952, Iceland extended its territorial waters
to four miles and although the UK reluctantly accepted it,
the conflict was aggravated with the unilateral extension by
Iceland of its fisheries zone in 1958 from four to twelve
miles and the prohibition of foreign vessels from fishing
within this limit.

In 1961, the United Kingdom and Iceland

concluded an agreement which included a compromisory clause
requiring party states to submit to the International Court
of Justice extensions of territorial waters of greater than
12 miles before enforcing them. 42 In 1971, ten years after
the acceptance of the twelve mile fisheries limit by
Britain, Iceland announced a new fishing limit of 50 miles,
effective as of September 1972.

The UK responded on April

14, 1972, by a formal complaint to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) demanding an injunction against the
Icelandic unilateral action. 43

The ICJ issued "interim

41Richard Bilder, "The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries
Dispute," 37 Wisconsin Law Review, (1973) p. 92-95.
42Barston and Hannesson, "The Anglo-Icelandic
Fisheries Dispute," 4 International Relations, London:
1974, p. 559.
43 I bi d, p. 149
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measures of protection on August 17, 197244 enjoining Iceland from enforcing the limits against Britain.
On September 27, 1973, as the tension between the two
nations continued, Iceland decided to sever diplomatic relations with the UK unless the latter were to withdraw its
warships from the disputed zone by October 3, 1973.
withdrew its naval forces. 45

Britain

While recognizing the prefer-

ential rights of Iceland, the ICJ ruled that.: "Iceland is not
entitled unilaterally to exclude the UK's fishing vessels
from areas between 12-50 miles limits or unilaterally to
impose restrictions on fisheries activities in such areas. ,,46
Contiguous Zone
Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone provided for a belt of the high
seas contiguous to the territorial waters within which the
coastal state may control specific actiVities, limited to
custom, fiscal, sanitary or immigration regulations. 47
On September 5, 1974, the USA's Coast Guard seized
the Japanese fishing vessel Taiyo Maru in its contiguous

44Al ona E. Evans, "Judicial Decisions," American
Journal of International Law, (1973) p. 145.
45"Ibid., p. 149.
4613 Int'l Legal Materials (1974) p. 1049. The
German-Icelandic fisheries dispute is also discussed in
pages 1098-1114.
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zone. 48

At the time, the legal status as provided in inter-

national law did not provide for fishing as a violation. 49
In making its case, the USA cited its 1966 Fishery Zone Act
and argued that the Convention on the Contiguous Zone did
not "i!I1pose a territorial limitation upon its authority. "50
While the issue is one of conflict between national and international law, it is not far fetched to infer that states
will inevitably uphold their national laws against international law when there is a conflict of interest involved.
Continental Shelf
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf defines
the shelf to the 200 meter isobath or "beyond that limit to
where the depths of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources.,,51
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,52 brought
before the International Court of Justice by West Germany,

48Eugene Fidell, "United States v. Fishing Vessel
Taiyo Maru No. 28" 70 American Journal of International
Law, (1976) p. 99.
49 I n the ICNT, fishing would be a violation of the
zone. Also the USA had passed a 12 mile Exclusive Fishery
Zone Act, supra note 15.
5070 American Journal of International Law, p. 100,
supra, note 48.
51Continental Shelf Convention, April 29, 1998, Art.
1 (1964) UN Doc. A/CONF.13/L55.
52Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Denmark, Germany v. Netherlands; 8 Int'l Legal Materials, (1969) p. 340-433.
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although a boundary problem, raised the issue of applicable
principles of international law over the delimitation of
the continental shelf.

On February 20, 1969, the Court

rules that there is no legal principle requiring the demarcation of the shelf boundary in accordance with the
principle of equidistance,53 as provided in pa~a 1 of Article 6 of that Geneva Convention.

This decision was justi-

fied on the grounds that Germany was not a party to the
treaty and therefore was not bound to abide by its provisions.
Norway has been reluctant to adhere to this Convention
because of the trough in the Norwegian shelf.

Norway re-

jects the position that its shelf ends at the trough and
maintains that the trough is only a depression in the shelf
which is a natural prolongation of its land territory.
Coastal states have the exclusive rights to explore
and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf
and failure to do so does not give any other nation the
right to exploit them unless through the expressed consent
of the coastal state.

Adjacent to the territorial waters

and to the seaward are high seas.
High Seas
The provisions of the Convention of the High Seas included freedom of navigation, of fishing, to lay submarine

53rnternational Court of Justice Reports, (1969) p. 3.
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cables and pipelines and overflight. 54

In addition to

these general freedoms that were open to all nations, the
coastal states were permitted special rights including
search and seizure of vessels and hot pursuit, which is the
pursuit into the high seas of a foreign vessel suspected of
having violated the laws or regulations of the coastal
ptate.

The pursuit must begin when the suspected ship is

within national waters, territorial waters or the contiguous zone of the pursuing coastal state.

In the case of

the contiguous zone, the foreign vessel must violate the
rights from which the zone was established. 55
Article 24 of the High Seas Convention obligates
states party to the treaty to enact laws regUlating oil
pollution of the sea from ships and pipelines and dumping
of radioactive wastes and other harmful agents. 56
Disenchanted with the inadequate coverage of the
Geneva Convention over pollution, Canada rejected the
notion of the freedom of navigation that may hinder coastal
states from intervening to protect their marine environment.

The result of this stance was the passage of the

Arctic Waters Pollution Control Act57 of 1970, establishing
54Law of the Sea Final Act, Art. 23, Convention, April
27, 1958, UN Doc. A/CONF.13/L53.
55Ibid., Art. 24 of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention.
56Ibid., Art. 25.
57The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act, 47 (Can.
1970) 62 Dept. of State Bulletin (1970) p. 609-6l0.
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pollution zones in the Arctic Waters to 100 miles from
every point of Canadian coastal territory above the 60th
parallel.

Within these zones Canada would control all

shipping, prescribe vessel construction standards, navigation and prohibit the passage of vessels in those waters
if necessary.58 The USA and UK protested the Act, arguing
that international law provides no basis for unilateral
extension of jurisdictions over the high seas.
Economic Zone
Economic zone is a new concept emerging from the
current Law of the Sea negotiations and has been defined in
the ICNT as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, and extending beyond to 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.

This

concept is often associated with Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
original parties to the Santiago Declaration of 1952. 59
If the ICNT became law, coastal states would have
rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural
resources of the economic zone and other specified activities such as energy production, scientific research and
preservation of the marine environment.

States are re-

quired to have due regard for the rights of other states;

58Ibid.
59S antiago Declaration, 66 American Journal of International Law (1972) p. 918. 64 nations now have 200
economie zones.
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although in an attempt to consider the interests of all
nations, the definition and provisions of the zone are such
as to create different interpretation of the legal status
of the zone.

Some nations will consider it high seas, others

as territorial seas, and a third group as sui generis, that
is, neither territorial seas nor high seas.
Custom, the 1958 Conventions and the UN Conferences
on the Law of the Sea have succeeded in establishing jurisdictions for ocean activities, but do not provide for
standards to respond to specialized activities or activities of collective concern.

Recognizing this void, states

developed specialized international marine related organizations.
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CHAPTER 2:

SPECIALIZED INTERNATIONAL MARINE RELATED
AGREEMENTS

International marine related agreements became popular, in part, because of the objections of some states to
customary law of the sea and because of the desire by
states to explore areas of greater interstate cooperation.
Also significant, is the realization by some states that
specific marine activities lend themselves more to international solutions than isolated national efforts.
Two categories of international marine related organizations will be explored in this study, non-United
Nations and UN affiliated.

Non-UN organizations are pri-

vately and independently operated from the United Nations.
The UN related organizations have their origin in Article

57 of the UN Charter which also establishes the principle
that these organizations with wide international responsibility should be operated outside the internal framework
of the UN itself.

All international organizations owe

their existence to either bilateral or multilateral
treaties.
Non-UN Marine Related International Organizations
Resource - Fisheries
Whereas in 1949 three fisheries stocks were believed
to be overfished and thirty others underfished, in 1968
the UN found nearly one-half of the thirty major stocks
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to have been fished to or beyond their maximum sustainable

--

yield. 60

It is estimated that if the present rate of

fisheries harvest continues, the annual catch will have
risen to 400 million tons by the year 2000. 61 There are
some 21 non-UN international cooperative organizations for
the management and conservation of fisheries.
The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) were considered eight years ago to
be the most promising fisheries arrangements because they
dealt with the majority of the world's problems and interests concerning fisheries. Today they are on the brink
of collapse. 62 Both of these commissions established national quotas and total allowable catches (TAC), published
information, recommended regulations for the conservation
and exploitation of designated species and the type of
fishing gear to be used in specified fishing areas. 63

As

of May 21, 1976, 17 nations were party members to the

60FAO, liThe State of World Fisheries: World Food Problems," No.7, FAO Report 1968.
61Jouvenal, liThe Economic Potential of the Oceans: A
Forecast for the Next Decade," Pacem Maribus 2 (1971) p. 13.
62William L. Sullivan, Jr., "The Decline of International Cooperative Fisheries Management, Looking Particularly
at the North Atlantic Ocean," United Nations and Ocean Management, Lewis Alexander, ed., Kingston, R.I.: University of
Rhode Island, 1971, p. 43-48.
63Yearbook of International Organizations, Brussels:
Union of International Associations, 1977, p. A2810.
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ICNAF Commission64 and 14 were members of NEAFC in 1976, at
which time 10 members were members of both commissions.
When the International Whaling Convention was ratified in Washington, D.C. on November 10, 1948, the International Whaling Commission established in 1946 came into
force.

The Commission develops regulations governing the

actual harvest of whales by nations of states party to the
Convention, conservation measures, and promotes scientific
investigation among member nations.

As of March 31, 1976,
15 nations were parties to the Convention. 65 The Convention has offered one of the substantial areas of cooperation and may serve as a model for other fisheries organizations.
United Nations Related
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsors
six fisheries conservation and management agreements, listed
in Appendix A, covering the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific
Oceans.

The Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central At-

lantic (CECAF) is composed of the coastal states from
Morecco to Zaire and the nations of France, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain,
United Kingdom and the USA.

The Committee acts as an

64 I bi d., p. A2811.
65Yearbook of International Organizations, Brussels:
Union of International Associations, 1977, p. A2808.
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advisory body to member states on matters such as collection and dissemination of information and training of
technicians.

The Committee has no regulatory powers as re-

gards conservation of species and this lack of authority
is common to FAO sponsored organizations.
Non-Resource - Marine Transportation
Marine transportation has increased dramatically over
the past twenty years, due to the acquisition of national
shipping lines by new nations and expanded international
trade.

The volume of cargo movement and the size and the

number of ships have risen sharply.

Table 1 shows the

volume of the world fleet by number and tonnage from 1966
through 1976.
Non-United Nations Organizations
In 1912 the US Maritime Law Association remommended

,

that the Comite Maritime International (CMI) examine the
prospects, for international regulation of ocean bills of
lading.

As a result a meeting was held at the Hague in

1921 during which the International Law Association adopted
the Hague Rules, later revised by an International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law at Brussels and became
the Brussels Convention of 1924. Some fifty nations are
parties to the Convention. 66 The CMI proposed "net work"

66N. Singh, International Conventions of Maritime
Shipping, vol. 8 of British Shipping Laws , London: Stevens
And Sons, Ltd., 1963, p. 1086-1087.

TABLE 1.

MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD 1966-76

Year

Number

1966

18,423

161,006

232,197

6.9

1967

18,800

171,522

250,403

7.8

1968

19,361

184,242

273,210

9.1

1969

19,570

196,247

297,523

8.9

1970

19,980

211,401

326,999

9.9

1971

20,544

230,302

361,739

10.6

1972

21,009

250,543

399,552

10.5

1973

21,600

275,727

446,370

11.7

1974

22,449

306,366

503,348

12.8

1975

22,872

333,042

556,572

10.6

1976

23,586

358,203

606,499

9.0

Source:

MARAn, US Department of Commerce, Merchant Fleets of the World.
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system adopted in Tokyo in 1969 and revised in Rome were
renamed Transport Combine Marchandise Convention. 67 The
rules are designed to meet the problems of multimode transport, especially with the advent of containerization.
United Nations Related
In the attempt to cope with the increased demand for
shipping, there are now some 7,365 Liner Conferences 68 to
regulate shipping services and freight rates.

Disagreement

exists between members of the developing nations and of the
developed states on the eonferences activities.

It is pos-

sib+e that Liner Conferences make sea transportation available at effective costs; however, not all nations are members of the Conferences.

There are no uniform prices, and

non-members may undercust rates, especially in subsidized
economies.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) drafted the famous 4:40:20 clause 69 which will
come into force when countries whose shipping tonnage
represents 25 percent of the world's total shipping ratify

67Sp ecial Report of the Committee on Bills of Lading
of Maritime Law Association of the USA, March 1970, 1
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, (1970) p. 651.
68UNCTAD, UN Conference of Pleni otentiaries on a Code
of Conduct for Liners Conferences, New York, Vol. 1 TD
CDE/13, 1975, p. 115
69 Ibid., p. 143.
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it.

Upon ratification, any volume of shipment between any

two parties shall be split as follows:

40% is alloted to

shipping companies of country of origin; 40% is alloted to
shipping companies of country of destination; 20% is
alloted to shipping companies of third countries.
The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization has contributed most to the development of shipping
laws and standards.

This organization (IMCO) was conceived

in 1948 and became operational in 1958 when the treaty
creating it was ratified. 70 IMCO acts as an advisory body
to member governments on maritime regulations, to promote
marine safety standards, to identify discriminatory or restrictive practices within the maritime industry to faci-

-

litate their removal and to foster international cooperation
in technical and operational matters. 71
The shipping safety rules currently enforced include
the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention amended in 1962, 1969,
1971 and 1973; the 1930 Load Line Convention amended in
1966; the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea, and the 1929 Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, amended in
1948, 1960, and 1972, commonly known as as "The International Rules of the Road.,,72
70IMCO Formal Existence, March 17, 1958, E/CeNF.4/1, 4.
71 I bi d., Annex II, Art. 12.
economic issues to UNCTAD.

IMCO has so far left

72 US Dept. of State, Treaties in Force, Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 1, 1978, p. 322-327.
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The issue of flags of convenience is associated with
much controversy.

Shipowners and flagstates practice it

for profits; other ocean users feel that the safety
standards for these vessels are inadequate and increase the
probability of marine casualties; and some nations consider
these vessels flags of necessity.

Flags of convenience are

defined here to include any ship, vessel, or craft navigating the oceans and carrying the flag of a nation by virtue
of registry rather than ownership.
In 1973, an Ad Hoc Maritime Transport Committee 73 was
established by IMCO to conduct studies related to this
class of vessels.

The permit to use a flag by a vessel is

usually granted for the convenience of the owner who pays
low fees to the flagstate and in return is able to take advantage of low repair costs, crew costs and taxes.

Efforts

to attract clientele may generate relaxation of standards,
creating the "lack of genuine link l1 74 between vessel and
flagstate.
Marine Pollution
The marine environment affects substantially the human

730ECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1974, p. 18.
74Th e Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, Art.

5, defines genuine link as effective exercise of jurisdictional control in the administrative, technical and social
matters of ships flying states flags.
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environment, and pollution of the oceans would adversely influence land territories.

Pollution has been defined as

the "introduction by man directly or indirectly of substances or energy into the marine environment, including
estuaries, resulting in such deleterous effects as harm to
living resources, hazard to human health, hinderance to
marine activities including fishing, impairment for use of
seawater and reduction of amenities. ,,75
Sources of marine pollutants include:
- landbased pollutants such as riverborne substances,
domestic sewage, and agricultural runoff.

It has

been estimated that forty percent of the oil entering the oceans and seventy percent of total pollution of the marine environment is landbased 76
- marine transportation is the means by which most of
the oil is transferred from one place to another.
The age of the vessel, construction, and crew efficiency affect the probability of becoming a
marine casualty.

The normal operations of marine

transportation are responsible for 43.4 percent of
all oil pollution. 77

In addition, military ships

75Comprehensive Outline of the Scope for the LongTerm and Expanded Program of Oceanic Exploration and Research, UN Doc. A/7750 (mimeo Nov. 10, 1969).
76NAS, Petroleum in the Marine Environment, Washington,
D.C.: National Academies of Sciences, 1975, p. 6.
77..............
I bi d .
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dump obsolete weapons, explosives, and wrecks into
the ocean.
- seabed exploration includes offshore oil exploitation and mineral mining of the ocean floor which
may pollute by blowouts 78
- dumping is the loading of a substance on any conveyance and transporting it with the expressed
purpose of discarding it in the oceans.

Dredge

spoils, sewage sludge and low level radioactive
material are some of the substances being dumped
now
nuclear wastes also pollute the marine environment.

The Convention on Ocean Dumping 79 specifi-

cally prohibits the dumping of high-level radioactive materials as classified in Appendix I.
It is difficult to determine the extent of damage,
the duration of the damage and the equitable amount
of compensation for injuries arising from nuclear
material. 80

78The Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969, and the North
Sea gas blowouts of 1977 are just two of such incidents of
pipeline or tank explosions.
79UN, A/CONF.48/1 W 6 MP 1/5 Annex V June 21, 1971.
The Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, drafted in
London from Oct. 30 through Nov. 10 and ratitied on Nov. 13,
1972 was initiated by the USA.
80 I CJ, 99,135, Reports, 1973, nuclear tests cases
between Australia v France and New Zealand v. France.
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~rine

environmentalism, which is the advocation and

exercise of protective measures to control pollution of the
marine environment, may be traced to the Torrey Canyon
casualty81 in 1967 off the coast of the United Kingdom.
Canada, citing this and the disasters of the Arrow in the
Chedabucto Bay, Mexico and the Showa Maru off the southeast
coast of Malacca Strait, rejected the traditional principle
of the freedom of navigation that may hinder the coastal
states from intervening to protect their marine environment
through stringent regulations and in some instances, the
actual destruction of casualty vessels.

Canada viewed this

principle as sanctioning vessels to pollute.
Non-United Nations Organizations
Most independent marine pollution control organizations are oriented to operate after there has already been
a marine casualty.

The Tankers Owners Voluntary Agreement

Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was created
as a voluntary scheme for tanker owners to meet the material
damage costs of spills, appease public criticism and delay
the rapid legal changes by some governments to impose
strict liability on pollution activities.

TOVALOP was es-

tablished in January 1969 and became operative in October
of that year. 8 2
81Charles Koburger, "The Shadow of the Torrey Canyon,"
Naval Engineers Journal, 86(1) (1974) p. 29.
82American Petroleum Institute, Report on the 17th Annual Tanker Conference, Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 105.
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In order to compensate tanker owners for higher
cleanup costs than provided in TOVALOP, the oil companies
instituted the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to
Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), to subsidize
liability payments of up to $30 million and reimburse tanker
owners involved in a spill accident up to $10 million.

Al-

though these arrangements are private, their activities
have affected UN related organizations such as IMCO.

For

example, in 1970, 18 oil companies created the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum to assist IMCO in the development of the IMCO Fund Convention. 83
United Nations Related
The Torrey Canyon accident expanded IMCO's involvement in matters of pollution of the marine environment.

The

need for this involvement was reinforced when states such as
Canada decided to adopt new pollution control measures, and
more recently, the USA.
In 1969, the Convention Relating to Intervention of
the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties84 was
concluded and entered into force on May 6, 1975. 85 The

83Ibid., p. 98
84Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done November 29, 1969,
9 International Legal Materials (1970) p. 25.
85US Dept. of State, 440 Dept. of State Bulletin,
1866 (1975).
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1971 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships is
perhaps the most ambitious and comprehensive measure taken
to protect the marine environment in any convention.

At-

tempts have been made in that Convention to balance the interests of flagstates, states with jurisdiction over the
operation of vessels, and port states. 86
The 1973 organizational _reforms .of IMCO provided .for
the formation of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) , and the Protocol on Intervention on the
High Seas in cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other
than Oil. 87
The 1972 UN Stockholm Conf-er-ence on the Human Environment recommended the establishment of a United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP).

The program is composed of a

governing council, an environmental secretariat and an environment fund. 88
Other International Arrangements of Special Interest
International Seabed Authority
A proposal for the establishment of an International
86Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships,
IMCO Doc. MP/Conf/WP35 (November 2, 1971).
87protocol on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases
of Marine Pollution by Substances other than 011, IMCO
Assembly Resolution A. 297(VIII) 1973, 13 International
Legal Materials (1974) p. 605.
88Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Cooperation, UN
General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) (9172), UN Doc.
A/8730 (1973).
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Seabed Authority is currently under difficult negotiations.
On August 17, 1967, the Maltese Ambassador to the UN proposed that the General Assembly resolve to reserve the seabed and ocean floor areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction for peaceful purposes. The following year a
resolution89 was adopted establishing a Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and fhe Ocean Floor beyond
Limits of National Jurisdiction.
The concerns of the United Nations regarding the development and exploitation of the resources of the seabed
and subsoil resulted in the declaration that these resources
are the common heritage of mankind. 90 The absence of a precise delineation between national and international jurisdictions led to the General Assembly's request in 1972 to
the Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor
to conduct investigations on the question. 91

The Authority

would offer the potential for developing resources of the
ocean floor for the benefit of all nations, recognize the
needs of landbased producers of minerals that are also exploited from the International Area, and provide for revenue sharing.

89UN Res. 2467 A (XXIII) Dec. 28, 1968, adopted by
112-0-7.
9 0UN Res. 2750(L) (XXV), Doc. A/802 B (1970).
91"UN Adopts Principles Governing Seabed Exploitation and Decides to Convene Comprehensive Law of the Sea
Conference in 1973," 64 Dept. of State Bulletin (1971)
p. 150.
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Axis Waters
Axis waters lie at the north-south axis of the globe.
As Prime Minister Trudeau stated, "the area to the north of
Canada, including the island and waters between the islands
and areas beyond are looked upon as our own, and there is no
doubt in the mind of this government, nor do I think in the
mind of former governments of Canada, that this is national
terrain.,,9 2 From a Canadian perspective, the establishment
of sovereign rights over these waters is of primary import.
Five nations that border the Arctic, Canada, the
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Norway and Denmark, have assumed the responsibility
to ensure coherent and optimal development of the waters of
the Arctic through joint efforts. 93
The Antarctic regime is based on the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty which declared the neutrality of the area and reserved
it for peaceful purposes. 94

Irrespective of the various

national practices the "Axis Waters" constitute a unique
marine environment and require international cooperative efforts to effectively explore, conserve, and protect it.
Table 2 lists the nations associated with the Axis Waters

92E.J. Dorsman, Arctic in Question, London: Oxford
University Press, 1976, p. 198.
93Ibid., p. 184.
94Gerard J. Mangone, The Elements of International
Law, revised ed., Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967,
P:-156.

43
regime.

In the case of the Antarctic, only states party to

the original treaty are listed.
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TABLE 2.

NATIONS OF THE AXIS WATERS REGIME

Basis for
Responsibility

Area

Country

Year

Arctic

Canada

1880, 1926

Sector theory

Denmark

1921

Jurisdictional extension over Greenland

Norway

1920

Jurisdictional extension over Svalbard

U.S.A.

1867

Alaska purchase

U.S.S.R.

1926

Sector theory

Argentina

1925

Antarctic Treaty

Australia

1937

"

Belgium

1959

Chile

1947

France

1924

Japan

1910

New Zealand

1923

Norway

1939

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

.Antar.ctic

South Africa 1959
U.K.

1917

U.S.A.

1939

U.S.S.R.

1959

Compiled from King H.G.R., Antarctic, Arco Pub. Co. New
York, 1969 and Baird Patrick, Polar World, Longmans
Green Co. Ltd., 1964.
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CHAPTER 3.

REGIONALISM

Traditionally, the underlying principle of regionalism was not uniformity, but a union of divergent political,
conomic and social systems to respond to a common problem.
Thus, states within the same geographical region facing a
collective problem would rally together in mutual assistance.
Recognizing this restricted traditional interpretation of regionalism, the United Nations in Articles 51 through
54 of its Charter permits the development of regional or-

ganizations for the maintenance of peace and security, but
also maintains that such regional arrangements must conform
with the aims and policies of the Charter and enforcement
measures must be approved by the Security Council.

However,

this traditional approach to regionalism would be ineffective in providing methods for management of ocean collective
activities that require uniform action.
The proliferation of extensive jurisdictional claims
over the oceans and their impact on scarce ocean resources
and the marine environment raise serious questions about the
scope of bilateral arrangements to effectively respond to
activities of collective concern.

Mulilateral or regional

cooperation seem to offer a better approach.

A regional

approach would cover areas within states' economic zones
including marginal seas.

A region is defined as "an in-

tellectual concept; an entity for purpose of thought,
created by selection of certain features that are
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relevant to a real interest or problem and by the disregard
of all features that are considered to be irrelevant. ,,95
The concept here is ocean internationalism, the relevant
features are uniform rules, standards, jurismictions and
regulations and the real interest is the rational utilization of a safe marine environment.

A brief survey of speci-

fic regional agreements in relation to the management of
ocean activities of collective interest will now be made.

Resource - Fisheries
Regional fisheries arrangements such as ICNAF and
CECAF96 promote fishing activities and operation within
states parties to the regional organization, collect, compile and disseminate information on biological factors of
fisheries, technological effectiveness of fishing gear, and
development of fishing industries especially in developing
nations.
Individual nations may furnish statistical data or
the organizations may actually acquire the data through
their own methods.

Fisheries research organizations are

usually better equipped to collect their own data.

Those

arrangements with regulatory powers may designate certain
95Lewis M. Alexander, Regional Arrangements in Ocean
Affairs, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May

1977, p. 11.

96Discussed under Specialized International Marine
Related Agreements, suprap. 30.
/
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areas closed to fishing vessels, specify fishing mesh sizes
and quotas.
Conservation and management is facilitated through
the use of data on biological factors, catch allocation and
enforcement.

Enforcement is normally performed by the in-

dividual states, but recently the inability of some member
nations to effectively control the fishing activities of
their fishing vessels has raised the question of delegating
enforcement to international organizations.
Non-Resource
The development of ocean resource exploration, exploitation and conservation methods is made possible by the
data and information provided by the scientific community.
The United Nations Education and Scientific Organization is
the prime promoter of regional marine scientific research.
This organization is charged with the responsibility to
"maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by recommending
the necessary international conventions, promoting research
programs and encouraging the international exchange of
scientists and scientific materials, and strengthening national infrastructure and regional cooperation.,,97
The Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC),
coordinates scientific activities of other agencies,

97Annotated Director of Inter overnmental Or
tions Concerned with Ocean Affairs,
New York, Aug. 10, 1976, p. 31.
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individual states, and the training and education of personnel especially of developing nations in marine sciences.
In 1976, the IOC transformed its Cooperative Investigations of Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (CICAR) into the
IOC Association for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions
(IOCARIBE), to promote scientific investigations and data
exchange through a regional information clearinghouse, training, and mutual 'a s s i s t anc e among member states. 98
The concerted effort to handle the pollution problems
of the Mediterranean Sea began in 1971 as evidenced in the
"Note on the Advisibility of a Regional Agreement on the Control of Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean" drafted by
an intergovernmental group on experts in London in 1971. 99
Following the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment,
UNEP sponsored the Mediterranean Action Plan to promote cooperation among the neighboring states for the protection
of this basin.

The expansion of the activities of the Action

Plan resulted in 1975 in the adoption of the Blue Plan to
study the longterm effects of development and its relation
to the marine environment of the Mediterranean. l OO Regional
arrangements such as this one are designed to offer regional
9 8Albert W. Koers, CICAR: Past, Present
Netherlands: University of Utrecht, 1974, p.

24.

and Future,

99Alexander, Regional Arrangements in Ocean Affairs,

p. 312.
lOOUNEP, Blue Plan, Nairobi: UNEP, 1976, Doc. UNEP/
Wg.2/5.
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responses to marine related problems of the region and may
prove to be an effective alternative. l Ol
Regionalism has also fostered the development of
ocean policies. On August~18, 1952, in the Declaration of
Santiago l 02 Chile, Ecuador and Peru made claims of 200
nautical miles over their adjacent waters. In 1970, the
Declaration of Montevideo l 03 on the Law of the Sea was
adopted as a statement of principle and in August of that
year the Declaration of Latin American States on the Law of
the Sea was signed in Lima. l 04

The African States Regional

Seminar on the Law of the Sea, 20-30 June 1972, adopted a
regional position on issues of the Law of the Sea. l 05
Appendix C lists current ocean management arrangements.
In the discussion of current ocean regimes, only
specific and significant cases have been examined.

Just as

lOlAlexander, Regional Arrangements in Ocean Affairs,
p. 295.
l02"Declaration of Santiago," American Journal of International Law 66 (1972), p. 918. This Patrimonial Sea Concept is viewed by member states as having the force of law.
Costa Rica is also a party to the Declaration.
103"Declaration of Montevideo," Int'l Legal Material 9 (1970), p. 1081.
104"Declaration of Latin American States on the Law
of the Sea," Int'l Legal Material 10 (1971), p. 207.
l05"African States Regional Seminar on the Law of
the Sea, 20-30 June 1972," Int'l Legal Material 12 (1973),
p. 210.
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ocean activities are complex, so too are the various management systems that have been devised and it would be futile
to attempt to narrate all of them.

The present status of

existing ocean regimes has been examined and an evaluation
and projected status of these system will next be surveyed
to determine their effectiveness in the management of and
utilization of ocean activities of collective concern.

PART TWO
EVALUATION OF PRESENT OCEAN SYSTEMS
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CHAPTER 4.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE DIFFERENT OCEAN REGIMES

Today 129 coastal states and 29 landlocked nations of
the world' s 158indep~endent cCDuntries l 06 are each competing
to secure an interest in the oceans.

Within the jurisdic-

tions of these nations approximately four billion people l 07
will be affected by any ocean regime, or those examined in
the preceding pages.

It is, therefore, important to evalu-

ate the different systems in order to determine their effectiveness and identify possible problem areas.
In evaluating present ocean regimes, I shall limit
myself to the management of activities of collective interest to the world community.

As indicated in Chapter 1,

these activities cannot be left to individual national control but lend themselves to cooperative effort.
National Approach
States are particularly concerned with the protection of their best interests as they perceive them.

As a

result, the states have enacted and promulgated occasionally
inconsistent regulations, standards and jurisdictions.

For

l06Appendix D lists the territories of the world,
subdivided into coastal, insular, and landlocked states and
areas of special status. The area, continental shelf area,
length of coastline, population, gross national product and
income per capita for each of the territories are given
when available.
l07The precise figure is 3,983 millions as calculated
from the Appendix for the year 1977.
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example, Argentina claims sovereignty over "the sea adjacent
to its territory for a distance of 200 nautical miles .•. ,,108
and the Soviet Union claims 12 miles. l G9
States' responses to pollution control exhibit the
same inconsistent pattern.

Of the few nations that had re-

gulations for the protection of the marine environment from
oil pollution as of 1971, Australia provides for jurisdictional control only over vessels within the territorial
110
waters,
Ghana over prohibited areas, and Sweden over
water areas which form part of Swedish territory.lll
The intent of these regulations and jurisdictional
controls cannot be questioned.

They are designed as re-

sponses to problems that states consider to be within their
area of competence.

Unfortunately, fish migrate and ves-

sels even with the most sophisticated electronic gear go
aground, can't fix with accuracy their positions at all
times and occasionally break up.

When a vessel becomes a

marine casualty, oil or cargo is released into the ocean.

108Law No. 17,094-M24 of Dec. 1966 on the Status of
the Breadth and Delimitation of the territorial Sea of Argentina, UN Legislative Series, ST/LEG/Ser.B/15, p. 55.
109Regulations of 5 Aug. 1960 for the Defense of
State Frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
ST/LEG/Ser.B/15 p. 211.
110UN Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/15 p. 271.
lllIbid., pp. 489 and 287.

52
While the ability of a nation like the United States of
America to enact legislation to protect its coastal waters
is a fait accompli, it would be wasted effort if the range
of jurisdictional control of pollution between the U.S.A.
and Canada were to differ.
The argument against inconsistent national regulations
can also be advanced for marine scientific research.
trend by some nations to limit the activities of

The

oce~n

scientific research must be viewed with apprehension, given
the. greater contributions this research has made towards a
better

understanding of the marine environments.

States with

the capability to carry out extensive research are usually
generous contributors to international marine research programs and the future of these programs

~ay.

be jeopardized

by coastal states restrictive ocean policies.

These incon-

sistencies in states practices arise because the regulations
are usually unilaterally derived.
States have occasionally exercised unilateral options
to assert claims but this approach is fraught with dangers.
An act or declaration initiated by a state contrary to the

intent of an existing or prOP·osed legal instrument is unilateral.

Such an act is not legally binding on other states.

Nevertheless, unilateral acts can have legal implications as when a party to a treaty breaches it.

Conse-

quently, unilateral acts can be classified as either positive or negative.

A positive or beneficial unilateral act

must benefit affected parties, meet tqe QQn$ent of
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affected parties and not violate any eXisting rule of international law.

It may be acceptable to extend national juris-

diction to 200 miles from the coastline, but if coastal
states were to unilaterally prohibit foreign fishing vessels,
scientific research, require all vessels in transit to maintain specific manning, equipment and construction standards
and be subject to national pollution control provisions
within the economic zone, the net effect would be anarchy.
Consequently, advocates of unilateralism as an
interim device for developing- Customary Law of the Sea must
first determine the nature and implications of such acts.
Fig. 3 illustrates the manner in which to estimate the
probable effects of unilateral acts especially with regards
to ocean activities of collective concern.

National efforts

at managing ocean activities of collective concern have demonstrated throughout the years that concerted efforts
rather than isolated unilateral acts may be the better alternative, hence the efforts made to codify the Law of the Sea.
Law of the Sea
The attempts to codify the Law of the Sea have resulted in the establishment of jurisdictional zones for the
conduct of states' activities and greater awareness by the
international community of the problem of managing the
oceans and their resources.

Some ocean standards have been

formulated for certain uses and efforts to improve these
standards are provided in the rCNT.

FIGURE 3 TESTING THE NATURE, EFFECT, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
UNILATERAL ACTIONS
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Nevertheless, the codification process has raised some
serious problems.

The exploitability test included in the

definition of the

continental

shelf in the 1958 conven-

tion was viewed in the 1970's by developing nations as an
obstacle to peaceful use of the submarine area because it
literally licensed technologocially advanced nations to appropriate the shelf.

Incidentally, the shelf has been de-

fined in the leNT as comprising the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond the coastal state's
territorial sea throughout the

naturaIRr.olo~atlmmofthe

land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured where the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
In order to protect their self-interest, coastal
states want the shelf defined to the outer edge of the
margin.

If such a definition became law and states

claimed the seabed to the continental margin, the economic viability of an established International Seabed
Authority (ISA) would be negated.

It might even be

tempting for nations non party to the treaty to unilaterally extend their economic zones to the limits of the
continental margin.
A direct relationship exists between the regime of
the high seas and the International Seabed Authority, for
both are open to all nations, coastal or landlocked.

No
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valid explanation can be advanced for the contention by
some that the ISA is the antithesis of the high seas regime.
Exploitation of the deepsea bed by ISA would not affect the
legal status of the superjacent waters.

If ISA is anti-

thesis to the high seas regime, the regimes of the economic
zone, continental shelf and, in short, the provisions of the
ICNT are misdirected.
As one Canadian official stated, "the potential implications of this new concept are far reaching and can
reshape the thinking of all of us about how to live together
in harmony and sharing instead of competing for finite
resources.,,112

Yet, if the control of marine pollution by

the International Seabed Authority (ISA) were to be extended to all the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the most productive areas of the oceans would
still be left unprotected.
nition of such a limit.

Also there is no precise defiISA, as an agency that concur-

rently promotes resource development and regulates the protection of the marine environment, would be faced with a
problem of conflict of interests.
Developing nations believe that the industrialized
nations are responsible for most of the pollution problems
of the environment and should accept the costs and stiffer

112J . Alan Beesley, 5th Annual Conference of the
Canadian Council of International Law, University of
ottawa, October 22, 1976, in a speech delivered to the
conference.

56
laws for pollution control.

This view accounts for the dual

marine pollution standards appearing in the ICNT and it seems
reasonable to expect that these developing nations would seek
financial and technical subsidies to adhere to stringent
pollution standards.

The following analysis on national

efforts to manage and protect the marine ecosystem reveals
the inconsistencies that characterize states actions both
present and projected.
International Approach
International marine related management systems have
derived powers and rights as a result of treaties between
nations.

States parties to a treaty determine the nature

of such powers, a factor that explains the limited or no
powers exercised by some international organizations.

In-

ternational marine institutions have facilitated the exploration, exploitation and conservation of ocean resources.
However, existing ocean regimes lack the ability to deal
effectively with problems of technological or political
changes.
The objectives of fisheries management arrangements
are to manage, conserve and exploit living resources.
Management is the process of directing available information, techniques and manpower to promote conservation and
utilization of fisheries.

Conservation is the practice of

limiting the exploitation of specific species deemed overfished through rules, regulations and conduct of individual
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states.

Exploitation is the actual harvest of the fisheries

resources for the purpose of utilization.
The objectives cannot be effectively implemented when
states have different strategies and international fisheries
agencies have either no or only regulatory powers.

As

Dykstra has observed, "the present arrangements in the North
Atlantic are not working well.
trouble, ... ,,113
fa~ing

They seem to be in serious

This statement reflects on the problems

international fisheries arrangements; their intent is

good, but their method is ineffective.

Attempts to improve

the regulatory powers of ICNAF, resulted in the withdrawal .
in 1977 by the U.S.A. and may crumble an organization that
less than ten years ago was a model international fisheries
agreement.
Despite the efforts made by IMCO to improve shipping
regulations and standards, the absence of the authority to
require states compliance to these measures and adherence
to implement these recommendations results in multiplicity
of standards.
By its creation IMCO is a consultative organization
with only advisory capacity.

Of course most of the recom-

mendations made by TIMCO are in force in several nations but
the manner in which these recommendations that have been

113Jacob Dykstra, "The International Fisheries Arrangements in the North Atlantic, 11 in Alexander Lewis,
UN and Ocean Management, 1971, p. 44, supra note 62.
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incorporated into national regulations are enforced differs
from state to state.

Since national ocean policies differ

among states, the regulations proposed by IMCO as uniform
international models become inconsistent and at times conflicting as nations enforce only selected ones.
UNCTAD clause 40:40:20 discussed in Chapter 2 fails
to recognize that most countries do not have the tonnage
capacity to meet these ratios; prospects for transcontinental competition would be undermined; "Cross traders,,114
or independent shippers would be severely affected; and
economic dislocation may be the result in some countries.
UNCTAD as an organization concerned with economic issues cannot effectively deal with the regulation of shipping practices.

Trade is part of the economic pagkage, but when an

issue falls within the competence of two organizations, a
common policy becomes necessary.

Dependence on customary

law would not alleviate the situation since this approach is
too slow and most developing nations object to this method
of developing ocean systems.
Perhaps the presence of uncertainty as regards the
operation and ability of international organizations to
deal adequately with ocean activities of collective concern encouraged the establishment of regional arrangements.
Regionalism
The accomplishments of regional arrangements have
114Blenkey, "World Shipping," Marine Engineer/Log, p.
214.
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already been observed, but they too are the products of international treaties.

Regional organizations are, perhaps,

the best available ocean systems although political uncertainty and self-interest tend to cripple their operations.
In isolated problems such as pollution control in semienclosed seas, regional methods can be effective, while in
areas of the open ocean the problem of transnational effects
persists.
For example, assume the U.S.A., Mexico and Cuba have
established a regional apparatus to control pollution of the
Gulf Basin.

Also assume that the states surrounding the

Caribbean Basin do not have any such pollution control arrangement.

Obviously, it would be a waste of effort and resource

for the former group to continue its control activity without
the cooperation of the latter group.
From these evaluations it can be postulated that,
- there is lack of uniformity and consistence in
states' jurisdictional claims, regulations and
standards for the utilization of the oceans and
their resources
- the split between the attitudes of developing
and developed nations over the responsibility to
control marine pollution is a probable source of
double standards.
- the existence of overlapping jurisdiction and
standards creates the potential for conflict.

60
the threat of unilateral states actions support
the need for collective action
the international arrangements lack the authority
to require states adherence to internationally agreed
standards, and as a result there are no uniform
international standards
the regional alternative is the best of the
existing approaches, but fails to offer innovative
solutions to comprehensive ocean problems.
these regimes have failed to satisfy the fundamental characteristics provided in the definition
of an ocean regime
these postulations emphasize the position that
present ocean systems should either be improved
or new alternatives developed.
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CHAPTER 5.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

National Level
The national approach to ocean management could be
improved through the exercise of greater powers by states,
but would weaken other systems.

Unilateral acts of states

could be sanctioned. for specific uses.

Such activities

would have to be defined and it would be difficult to control
and to guarantee their limited application.
Conversely, greater restriction could be placed on
states' powers.

The reluctance of some states to accept

such limitation has caused the disintegration of certain
marine related agreements.

There is the view among some

nations that the notion of limitation of states' powers is
unpopular among developing nations.

I contend that these

states oppose even more the concept of sovereign inequality
than internationally agreed limitation of states powers.
To substantiate this position, it is only necessary to
examine the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of
states which the developing nations would consider as a
means to achieving political equality and economic participation among states. 11 5 The Charter attempts to promote
economic and political cooperation based on soverign equality.

115UNCTAD, Report of the Working Group on the Charter
of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, Doc. TD/BI
AC.12/1, March 6, 1973, p. 4.
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Recently, the developing nations have made concrete
demands and changes within different international organizations as a means of reaffirming political equality.

Per-

haps the best example is current negotiations at the Third
Law of the Sea Conference.

The deadlock over the powers of

the International Seabed Authority does not reflect the resistance of developing nations to accept limited sovereignty,
but their desire to assert political equality.
International Level
The authority of international organizations could be
reinforced giving them powers over the development of regulations and standards and to require compulsory states
compliance.

For example, current efforts by IMCO to insti-

tute specific recommendations for crew training could be
made mandatory for all nations parties to the Convention.
As an interim measure, the International Seabed
Authority, if and when established, could be given the power
to regulate and protect the areas .of the oceans beyond the
limit of national jurisdictions whatever the definition of
that limit.

Suffice to mention that the problems of na-

tional multiple measures in the economic zones, where most
ocean activities would be conducted, will persist.
Regional Level
Regional organizations could also be given greater
powers and ori"eniied towards the development of uniform
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regional measures such as uniform jurisdictions and
standards.

Although I have asserted that regional approach-

es are the best available ocean practices for managing the
resources, the lack of uniformity in their design and
method and piecemeal solutions to problems requiring comprehensive and collective efforts, suggest that alternative
ocean regimes may be developed.
However, before exploring any possible alternative
ocean system, it is pertinent to examine the obstacles that
have impeded the proper functioning of existing systems since
a new regime would be subject to the effects of these obstacles.
Obstacles
The political scene of the world has changed dramatically since the turn of the century.

Many states have

acceded to independence and the desire of these so called
Third World nations to participate in the shaping of world
events has given the arena of international politics a new
flavor.

To further emphasize this shift in world politics,

these nations have in recent years adopted an international
strategy of solidarity in their dealings with developed
nations.
The belief by some third world people that ascendance to independence equated sovereignty with equal influence has been frustrated by the grant of permanent membership to some states in the Security Council of the United
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Nations with powers to veto decisions of other nations.

The

developing states view this practice as tantamount to sanctioning political inequality.
There is also a direct relation between national and
international political influence, since domestic political
policies usually determine states' international political
affiliation.

Democracy and Socialism have emerged as the

two giant magnets between which the national politics of
developing nations oscillate.

Clssely related to politics

is the economic factor.
Various forms of economic systems proliferate in the
international community, usually variations of free enterprise and planned economies, creating disequilibriums which
are further amplified by the disparity between poor and rich,
developed and developing nations.

In recent years, states

have taken appropriate measures to combat these differences.
On December 12, 1974, by a vote of 12:6, 10 abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, emphasizing in its preamble that:

"It is a fundamental purpose of

this Charter to promote the establishment of the new
economic order, based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states
irrespective of their domestic and social systems. lll 16
116UNCTAD, Doc. TD/B/AC.12/1, March 6, 1973, p. 4.
Supra note 1J.5.
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It was a pledge by statesmen of the need to discover and
construct economic unity from political, economic, social
and cultural diversity.
A new economic order would involve a deliberate
restructuring of the world's economies and an adjustment of
growth and distribution to achieve economic equilibrium.
Growth as used here is the accumulation and reinvestment of
societal profits to achieve technological independence.
The sectors of society that cannot manipulate or acquire
the necessary technology to boost productivity generally
suffer the adverse effects of market failures. 117
Distribution ought to be the rational utilization of
available economic resources to promote growth and development throughout the economic system.

The dichotomy claimed

by some writers to exist between growth and distribution is
a source of misunderstanding.

The two are directly related,

affecting society at every stage of economic development.
Economic development is determined
logical progress.

~n

part by techno-

Unfortunately, not every sector of

society has the technology and some sectors import it when
the terms of transfer are favorable.
fer can be classified as: 119

Technological trans-

117Describes those circumstances in the economy with
elements of monopoly, immobilities of factors, and imperfect knowledge of market conditions.
118Simon S. Kuznets, Modern Economics: Rate Structure and Stread, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1967, p. 4 3 and also UNCTAD, Doc. TD/B/310, 1970.
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1.

information and literary exchange

2.

machinery and equipment

3.

investment

4.

human factor through training.

The transfer usually takes the organizational forms of majority foreign owned equity, majority domestic owned equity
and entirely domestically owned.
Monetary stability is an essential economic ingredient.

Current monetary practices have caused one economic

crisis after another and the devaluation of currencies is a
frequent occurpence in some nations. 119

The erratic fluc-

tuation of parities and the distributional effects of inflation are severe in countries with falling currency
values.
Although political equality and a new economic
order can be achieved only through interstate cooperation,
some nations still believe in a rigid interpretation and
application of sovereignty.

Based on the practices of

states, sovereignty can be defined as the supreme authority
over land territory, or the union and exercise of all human
power to enact and promulgate laws, make war or peace and
form treaties in international transactions.
However, this limited interpretation can no longer
be acceptable when applied to ocean activities capable of

119Montbrial Thierry, "For A New World Economic
Order," Foreign Affairs Journal, 54(1) Oct. 1975, p. 64.
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generating transnational effects or externalities,120 whose
effective control requires collective action.

Sovereignty

is subject to the dynamic evolution of world events, undergoing change and refinement from within and without, directly molded by states interrelations.
The world has witnessed the movement of sovereignty
as a colonial privilege to the exercise of sovereignty by
different independent nations.

Today sovereignty on inter-

national activities means one thing to the member states of
the Organization for African Unity than it does to either
the U.S.A. or Britain.

Political freedom was the collective

interest that led to this change.

Thus, whenever there is

a collective activity at stake sovereignty is bound to be
modified.

An example of the dynamic effect of collective interest on sovereignty is the question of hijacking which
began in 1973.as a bilateral issue between the U. S. A. and
Cuba.

On July 9, 1978 at the Economic Summit Conference

held in Bonn, West Germany, the Heads of States issued an
impressive and almost surprising declaration.

In an em-

phatic resolution Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy

120Charles S. Pearson, International Marine Environment Policy: The Economic Dimension, Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 4. Externalities are defined as the direct (non-market) imposition of costs or
benefits on one economic agent as the incidental result of
the activities of another economic agent.
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Japan, and the U.S.A. declared their intention to institute
flights embargo against any nation harboring or failing to
prosecute hijackers.
There may seem to be no relationship between hijacking
and ocean activities of collective interest; suffice to
emphasize that hijacking of ships is not uncommon and is referred to as piracy.

In addition, hijacked planes may have

to overfly the territorial waters of states party to the
hijack agreement as more nations join the Bonn Declaration.
Although the Bonn Declaration is a good example of
change and collective action, the most striking examples of
the effect of change on sovereignty are the conclusion of
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which have resulted in the trend towards interdependence among states and rendered the traditional interpretation of sovereignty obsolete.

This point was em-

phatically stressed at the United Nations General Assembly
by the representatives of the Big Powers excluding the
Soviet Union, in 1949 in the statement that "all the super
powers put world Eecurity first and are prepared to accept
innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty and economic organization ... ,,121

This statement paved the way for the movement

from the cold war to detente, dominance to cooperation and

l21William Sanders, "Multilateral Diplomacy," XXI
Dept. of State Bulletin No. 527, August 8, 1949, p. 163.

69
exploitation to mutual interdependence among nations.

Thus,

the changes occurring in the world social construct as a
result of technological and political progress and the
delicate search for the pivotal point between "mare liberum"
and "mare clausum" for the management of ocean activities
warrant the modification of the definition and interpretation of sovereignty.
Can the Obstacles Be Resolved?
Solutions to these obstacles cannot be found in present ocean systems.

Of primary concern and as a premier

step, ocean activities of collective concern should be identified and documented.

The political split between the

developed and developing nations should be remedied to
achieve interdependence.

While the split is a massive prob-

lem, a compromise could be reached granting developing
I

states greater political participation in the decision making
process of international marine organizations and guaranteeing non-imposition of improper restrictions on the legitimate actions of developed nations.
Such a compromise can be reached only through the
recognition that developing nations would no longer accept
decisions or practices that affect their economic and political integrity without full participation.
lective concern can no longer be decided
one nation.

~

Issues of colfortiori by any

Conversely, the developed nations cannot accept

policies that tend to be imposed by a developing nation led
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majority.

Both the developing and developed nations must

accept the changes that have taken place for that is the one
element that neither side can overlook.
The economic problem is one of balancing distribution and development.

In this regard, the economic system

options should be of minor importance.

Any economic system

need to utilize resources, capital and technology and the
so-called planned economies of developing nations have in
many cases been adopted because of the absence of these
factors of production.

The UN Charter of Economic Rights

and Duties of States is a step in the right direction.
The world is experiencing a new politico-economic
force directed by nations controlling large resource concentrations.

The Arab oil embargo of 1973, for example, was

a display of that force, the effects of which are still being
felt.

If the problem of distribution and development is

not handled urgently and effectively, the oceans may become
a confrontation ground for resource and

~nergy

purposes.

Sovereignty is the 90urce of all other obstacles.
If the rigid traditional interpretation of sovereignty is
upheld, no ocean regime will survive.

The net result would

be inconsistent ocean policies and probably conflict over
collective resource use.

I have claimed that sovereignty

is dynamic, subject to change and the world community ought
to designate sovereign rights over ocean activities of
collective concern collective sovereign rights.

This
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designation would place such activities under the management
and control of international collective effort since these
activities cannot be left to individual national control.
These would be rights applicable to specific uses within determined limits and subject to modification as warranted by
the dicta of social change.

The key to solving the other

obstacles resides in this modified conception of sovereignty.
Thus, if the international community were to identify
and designate ocean activities of collective concern to be
subject to collective sovereignty, it would be possible to
determine the role of developing states, guarantee the legitimate activities of developed nations and ensure proper
operation of any international marine related organizations.
The institution of collective sovereignty would reduce the
north-south gap, bridge the political split and economic
disparity, since inter-state cooperation would become a
fact of international life.
The postulations that national regulations and jurisdictional assertions over ocean activities of collective concern are inconsistent; that international marine organizations lack the authority to require states' compliance; and
that regional efforts occasionally do not exhibit uniform
standards lead to the position that an alternative ocean
system, perhaps limited to the management of collective
ocean activities, is desirable.
Such a system is based on the thesis that individual
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states national regulations, rules, and jurisdictional claims
over the oceans and their resources are inadequate, inherently inconxistent and lack uniform international standards
to ensure rational utilization.

The oceans are a common pool

or joint resource and cannot be subject to exclusionary
states practices.

However, as 158 nations seek to maximize

ocean utilization, the incremental effect of their marginal
individual impacts depletes resources and deteriorates the
marine ecosystem resulting in the "tragedy of the commons."l22
International arrangements provide standards, but the
application of these standards by states is not uniform.

The

issue is not merely the creation of standards, but of
uniform internationally enforced standards.

An international

uniform standard has been defined as an authoritative model
to gUide the conduct of nations and is applicable prima
facie to specified activities.

Thus, when vessels plying

the high seas are required to carry double operative radars,
all nations ought to enforce this requirement on their
flag vessels.

The model becomes a uniform international

rule and standard.
To accomplish standardization of ocean regulations
for collective uses, a comprehensive regime must be developed and entrusted with the authority to combine jurisdictions and standards into uniform international

operati~e

122Hardin Garett, "Tragedy of the Commons," Science,
p. 143.
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models.

I am not advocating an ocean leviathan, but a sys-

tern representing all interests, all nations, responsitte to
world changes, and designed to direct in an orderly manner
ocean uses.

This study proposes for such a system the

creation of a World Ocean Management Authority (WOMA).
differentiation between authority and

The

power must be made at

this point since the interchangeable use of these terms is
responsible for the current resentful attitude towards
authority.
Power is "that condition when the will remains able
to express itself in such action as tends to the fulfillment
of wish. ,,123 In response to a crisis, a disproportionate
degree of power may be exercised to obtain the desired results.

The potential to use a higher level of action than

is necesssary creates the power threat and the hesitation
of states to accept powerful agencies.
In contrast, authority as used here is that condition
favoring the rational application of knowledge to realize
collective values through voluntary agreement. 1 24 Power and
authority, then, are not synonymous because the former can be
expressed arbitrarily while the latter is a mutally reasoned,

123George E. Catlin, A Study of the Principles of
Politics, New York: Russell and Russell, 1967, p. 154.
124Carl Joachim Friedrich, Tradition and Authority,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, p. 45-66. I have redefined value as the significance attached to the intensity
of a common experience.
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or "raison d'etre" process applying knowledge, the embodiment
of the total human experience in the field under consideration to achieve a common goal.

This is the nature of the

authority of the proposed system.
Four objectives are basic to the system:
1.

The Law of the Sea is the legal framework for
establishing uniform jurisdictions and standards.
A code of substantive and procedural provisions
would become an ocean constitution capable of elevating the law's capacity to technological advances,
eradicting existing pathologies and exhibiting
flexibility in practice.

2.

The pressures exerted on the oceans and their resources require a management system that ensures
sound conservation, exploration, and exploitation
policies.

An application of uniform standards and

rules would safeguard the different interests and
protect the overall quality of the marine environment.

3.

Since the oceans affect the economies of nations, due
consideration must be given to the concept of a new
world economic order.

In a comprehensive ocean

management arrangement, the transfer of resources
from one sector to another must be rational in order
to avoid creating disequilibrium in distribution.
The less favored states should be provided the necessary tools to promote their economic development.
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4.

Management of ocean activities of collective interest
cannot be left to individual states' discretion.
Enforcement of different regulations and standards
create the potential for conflict.

An effective

ocean management system must be instituted internationally.

Having claimed that existing ocean

systems cannot provide effective solutions to activities of collective concern nor satisfy the above
outlined objectives, I will now develop a plan for a
model system.

PART THREE

ALTERNATIVE OCEAN SYSTEM
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CHAPTER 6.

WORLD OCEAN MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

The proposed World Ocean Management Authority is
based on the following assumptions:
All independent nations, whether members or nonmembers of the United Nations Organization, shall in
their interrelations act in conformity with peaceful
principles "in order to preserve international peace,
security and justice. ,,124

Political maturity is pre-

requisite to enable states to responsibly balance
self-interest and other acts against these principles.
Contradictory practices must be identified and controlled to realize the necessary interdependence and
cooperation.
There are some ocean activities that require collective action.

Isolated efforts of individual nations

would be ineffective for their management.

In order

to institute collective action, the concept of sovereignty as exercised on land must be transformed into
the concept of collective sovereignty.
All national claims over the oceans shall be limited
to 321.8 km. or 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the territorial waters are measured.

This

ceiling placed on extra-territorial extensions is the

124L. Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 41.
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base for establishing any ocean regime and central to
jurisdictional uniformity.

This limit is selected to

conform with the economic zone concept which is likely
to become common practice, the outcome of the ICNT
notwithstanding.
As jurisdictions and interests overlap, and the demand
for ocean resources increase exclusionary practices are
not only tempting, but become inevitable.

An exercise

of exclusionary practices over collective uses is
likely to create conflict.
The protection of the marine environment cannot be .
left to the discretion of individual nations.

Individu-

al efforts to control pollution in the oceans is ineffective.

Pollutants in the marine ecosystem are con-

stantly in motion, traversing national boundaries and
affecting the quality of life, and require collective
action.
Uniformity of standards and action is essential to the
effective control of ocean activities of collective
interest.

The application of uniform international

standards would facilitate the coordination of the
intricate symbiosis of collective ocean uses and
states' practices.
To create a World Ocean Management Authority, a convention with representatives from independent nations of
the world similar to the Third Law of the Sea Conference
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would adopt a resolution on an ocean constitution, identify
ocean activities of collective concern, establish collective
sovereignty over such activities and mandate all nations to
submit to compulsory jurisdiction of the Authority.
I recognize that the notion of compulsory jurisdiction
has never been received favorably by some nations since the
institution of the International Court of Justice.

Again,

the apparent existence of sovereign inequality among nations
is responsible for such an attitude.

Equal sovereignty as

would be expressed through collective sovereign rights would
eliminate states suspicions over the activities of other
states.

The transition from the domination of world economic

and political activities by the industrialized nations to the
sudden emergence in power of nations controlling large concentrations of resources require a balance that can be protected only by compulsory jurisdiction.
Powers of the Authority
WOMA would have:
- all legislative powers vested in the Ocean Congress
which would consist of a Conciliar and an Assembly.
- would not infringe on states rights within 321.8 km.
or 200 nautical miles seaward, from the baselines
from which the territorial waters are measured,
consistent with international law and the ocean
constitution.
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would establish uniform rules, regulations and standards
for management and use of collective ocean activities.
In the process of initiating, defining and instrumenting
uniformity, the Authority would review suggestions from
individual states and from world ocean councils.
would resolve conflicts arising from collective ocean
uses and hold states accountable for non-compliance
with international ocean policies.
would interpret and develop new ocean treaties and formulate laws that need to be changed and redrafted.
would coordinate ocean activities of collective interest
that cannot be entrusted to individual nations; for
example, pollution control, ship design and seabed
mining in the international areas.
would administer the activities of the intennational
areas through the World Ocean Deepsea Council, with the
International Seabed Authority as the mining industry.
would facilitate the contribution and distribution of
monetary obligations by states through an equitable
formula.
would coordinate the activities of the various councils
by maintaining continuous communications between the
councils, functional regions and states.
Functions of the Authority
The World Ocean Management Authority would exercise
the powers entrusted to it by the ocean constitution:
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to promote rational management and conservation of ocean
resources.
to facilitate marine scientific research, technological
transfer and economic cooperation.
to ensure that non-resource use of the oceans is conducted in a manner compatible with the directives of the
Authority.
to construct a new environmental theory of development
and a better method to regulate the utilization and exploitation of the ocean submarine area.
to consider for approval the budget, method of financial
support and procedural regulations for the internal
administration of the councils.
to devote its powers to the achievement of the Authority's objectives and the protection of the interests
of the international community.
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CHAPTER 7.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AUTHORITY

Composition
The World Ocean Management Authority (WOMA) would consist of the Conciliar, the Assembly and the Seven Councils
that constitute the ocean Congress.

Officials of the

Authority would be renumerated from its budget and individual states' representatives to the Assembly would be compensated by their respective governments.
Conciliar
The Conciliar, the highest functional body, would have
one representative from each region.

For this purpose the

world has been grouped into the following nine functional

-

regions:
1.

Africa

2.

Asia (includes Japan)

3.

Central and South America

4.

Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.

5.

Middle East (includes Iran)

6.

North America

7.

Oceania (includes Indonesia and Papua New GUinea)

8.

Western Europe (includes Iceland, Greece, Turkey
and Cyprus)

9.

World Ocean Deepsea Council (WODSEAC) (covers all
international areas as defined in this study)

(~cludes

Greenland

These functional regions are depicted in Fig. 4.
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The independent states of each region would choose a
representative to the Conciliar.

When a region enoompasses

a political or economic organization such as the Organization for African Unity the choice may be made within the
auspices of that organization.

In regions with no such ar-

rangements, the Triadic voting process discussed later could
be used by states of the particular region to choose their
representative.

Each representative to the Conciliar would

serve a five year renewable term not to exceed ten consecutive years.

The president of the International Seabed

Authority would be the legal representative of the World
Ocean Deepsea Council region to the Conciliar.
Assembly
All independent states are represented and may send as
many delegates as they choose to the conventions of the
Assembly, but only seven may exercise voting rights.

The

rationale for setting the official number of states' representatives at seven assumes that each of them shall be knowledgeable in matters of at least one of the seven councils.
This expertise would facilitate dialogue and help circumvent
lengthy debate.

Individual governments determine the length

of the term of service of their delegates.

Since the World

Ocean Deepsea Council represents the region covering the
Axis continents and areas beyond national jurisdiction, it
would be represented in the Assembly by seven delegates, one
from each of the seven councils.

These seven representatives
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will exercise voting power equivalent to that of one state.
New regulations, amendments to regulations and the
ocean constitution, revised standards, and policies would
be made during the assembly sessions.

The Assembly would

also review and appraise reports by states on their enforcement efforts and accountability.

An effective method of decision-making is essential to
the functioning

cr

any organization.

Decisions, rules,

standards and policies could be adopted in the Assembly
through the use of the Triadic voting process.
combines equal voting and weighted voting.

This approach

An equal voting

system allocates equal numeric value or power to the votes
of individual states.

A weighted voting system acknowledges

the existence of special characteristics of the individual
state such as size, population, or power and grants greater
numeric power to the votes of some states.
It can be argued that a weighted voting system implies
sovereign inequality because of differing national characteristics.

Equal voting, on the other hand, fails to con-

sider the importance of these characteristics.

Today, the

developing nations outnumber the developed states in the
United Nations General Assembly and vice versa in the
Security Council.

Thus equal voting would tend to favor

the developing nations.

However, because members of the

Security Council can exercise veto power, the developed
states have the advantage in this respect.
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The Triadic process would eliminate these problems by
combining an equal and weighted voting procedure.

The

Assembly decision would be determined by the application of
three voting components, namely:
vote, and the Conciliar vote.

states vote, regional

The Assembly would proceed

as follows:
states vote
As was stated earlier, each nation would have seven representatives exercising voting rights, as instructed by
their various governments.

The result of these seven indivi-

dual votes determine the one individual state vote.

The one

states' vote is determined by the majority of the individual
states' votes.

In the event of a split vote in the individu-

al states' votes, the voting capacity provided WODSEAC is
invoked to represent the equivalent of an individual state
vote.
Regional vote
The individual votes of the representatives of the
states of a region are tabulated to determine each individual regional vote.

The majority of the individual re-

gional votes determines the one regional vote.

The minority

vote of a state may be significant in determining the regional vote, since it is the votes of the individual representatives that are counted rather than the individual
state votes.
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Conciliar vote
To ensure that the members of the Conciliar do not
practice bipartisan politics, their votes may be cast in a
separate room by secret ballot.

The majority of the nine

individual votes shall determine the nature of the one
Conciliar vote.
Decision
The nature of the one states, regional and conciliar
votes determine the voting result.

The majority of the

three components will constitute the decision to adopt or
reject the voted issue.

The equal weight that is given to

each individual state vote in determining the one states vote
constitutes the equal voting component of this Triadic
voting process.

The weighted voting component is seen in

the regional vote.

The number of states per rggion varies,

and thus the votes of the states in regions with smaller
numbers of states have greater weight in determining the
regional vote than those of states in regions with larger
numbers of states.

Because the members of the Conciliar

were elected by the states of their respective regions, the
veto effect of the one Conciliar vote can be attributed
to all states.
Councils
There would be seven councils operating as the executive extension for the World Ocean Management Authority.
States would submit proposals for new regulations or

86
standards to the appropriate council for revision and refinement after which they are submitted to the Conciliar.

The

councils would supervise internal operations and direct the
external functioning of regional activities.

The permanent

seats of the functional r.egions would be selected by the
nations of the region.
The World Oceans Councils would be grouped as follows:
World Ocean Resource Councils
1.

World Ocean Deepsea Council (WODSEAC)

2.

World Ocean Fisheries Council (WOFIC)

3.

World Ocean Navi~ation and Transportation
Council (WONTRAC)

World Ocean Service Councils

4.

World Ocean Scientific and Environmental
Council (WOSEC)

5.

World Ocean Technology and Economic
Council (WOTEC)

6.

World Ocean Dispute Settlement Council (WODISEC)

7.

World Ocean Management Affairs Council (WOMAC)

WODSEC would be based at the seat "of the Authority at
the United Nations Organizations headquarters and its operation directed by the International Seabed Authority as
provided in the ICNT.

Fig. 5 depicts WOMA's organizational

profile.
Enforcement
The World Ocean Management Authority would be granted
under the Ocean Constitution the mandate to promote its
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objectives for the benefit of all mankind and that requires
the ability to induce states aCquiescence.

To establish the

rapport between states and the Authority that is prerequisite
to an effective system, WOMA's enforcement capacility would
be based on:
confidence derived from the Authority's manner of
functioning.
identification with the problems, aspirations and goals
of the states to offer effective responses.
reciprocity in the mode of arriving at decisions, defining rules or standards, analyzing possible solutions and implementing prerogatives to achieve compliance from states.
sanctions by the Assembly may be applied to states
for noncompliance to decisions of the Authority.
Through the Ocean constitution, states have subrogated
speci~ied

rights in ocean interests to the Authority.

The process of mandating WOMA to represent states and
to protect these interests would create estoppels. 125
The question of sovereignty was discussed at length,
culminating in the conclusion that states sovere,ign rights
over transnational ocean

activi~ies

should be designated as

Collective Sovereign rights, derived from within the confines of other states rights.

Implied is the notion that

125G. Schwarzenberger, Manual of International Law,
London: Institute of World Affairs, 1972.
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states cannot be rational in their interaction with other
states while exercising unlimited freedom of action.
States should not repudiate statements or engagements
duly entered into by authorized representatives.

Acquies-

cence, consent, and declaratory resolutions constitute
methods by which states can be estopped. 1 26 Estoppels
create obligations and responsibilities, provided the intent
of the declaration is based on good faith, clearly understood, voluntarily and unconditionally accepted, and authorized by the states. 127 States are obligated to respect
rights of other states to gain respect for theirs.

WOMA

would not be a "civi tas maxima," but an authority born out of
a voluntary act of "espirit de cooperation."

In short,

states would bind themselves to enforce generally agreed
upon uniform rules and standards, making the decisions of
the Authority self-executing.
The functions, powers and organization of the World
Ocean Management Authority have been outlined.

The opera-

tions of the various councils will now be examined.

A

126D. W. Bowett, 33 British Yearbook of International
Law, London; Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 202. That
estoppel is a general principle of international law, has
been expressed in several instances by the International
Court of Justice; for example, "Arbitral Award by the
King of Spain," (LC.J. Reports (1960) p. 192-213) and
"Temple Case,. (LC.J. Reports (1962) p. 6-32).
127Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 2nd
ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 619.
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small number of personnel would be at the Authority's headquarters at the United Nations to serve on the World Ocean
Management Affairs Council, the administrative arm of the
Authority.

This council operates under the direct super-

vision of the Conciliar.

Most of the staff of the other

councils would be stationed in the functional regions.

The

regions would determine the geographical spread of the
councils.
The Ocean Congress would identify eXisting marine related activities, treaties, and organizations; integrate
them into uniform models and classify them appropriately
within corresponding council jurisdiction.

Future arrange-

ments, treaties and standards would be handled in the same
manner.

This process of identification, integration and

classification of activities would expedite the Authority's
operation and provide a means to evaluate the entire system.

PART FOUR

WORLD OCEAN RESOURCE AND SERVICE COUNCILS
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CHAPTER 8.

WORLD OCEAN RESOURCE AND SERVICE COUNCILS

Resource and seryice councils would assist states in
the rational management, conservation and exploitation of
the oceans and their resources by applying uniform standards,
adopted by the Ocean Congress.
World Ocean Deepsea Council (WODSEAC)
The jurisdiction of WODSEAC is limited to the area of
the seabed and subsoil beyond 321.8 km. or 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the territorial waters
of the coastal states are measured.

It may participate in

the use of the water column of that area, as may any individual, under the freedom of the high seas principle.

The

four geographical areas under the jurisdiction of WODSEAC
are:

Atlantic Ocean, the Axis Continents, Indian Ocean

and Pacific Ocean.
The nine functional regions would be represented
equally in the council.

The lead Agency would be the In-

ternational Seabed Authority and

its seat may also become

the headquarters for WODSEAC.
Operation
The International Seabed Authority would be a world
ocean Manganes Nodules Mining Industry.

Prospective sites

would be classified by value as determined by the best
available technology and potential miners, private, state,
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or natural would apply for allocation permits from the
Council.

The allocation procedure would be that of a

bidding and leasing system.

Fees and royalties would be

charged to miners for the duration of their mining activities on a site.

All leased sites would be registered with

the Council.
Environmental standards and safety requirements would
be incorporated into all mining operations, because disturbance and redistribution of sedimentation would result. 1 28
The Council may invest in ten percent of the assests of
each mining entity.

This would render deep seabed mining

operations joint ventures.
Licensing has been proclaimed by delegates to be a
"most efficient and profitable,,129 device.

In addition to

ensuring the collection of revenues, this approach would
mitigate the fears of large scale exclusive participation
by a few technologically advanced nations, the risk of conferring ownership rights and deterrence of

~echno~Qgy

transfer.
Ocean dumping to be carried out within the area described herein would be registered with the Council, especially when it inolves substances of either low or high
radioactivity.

128pearson, Ocean Floor Mining, 132.
129UN Doc. A/AC 138/SC.l/SRs 19 and 41, statements by
British and French delegates.
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The "axis waters" fall within the jurisdiction of
WODSEAC and given the special character of these waters, I
propose the following recommendations:
1.

the development of a formula to compensate states
with possib~e claims in resource or revenue sharing

2.

the freezing of any new claims

3.

the limitation of national boundaries to 321.8 km.
or 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which
the territorial waters of states are measured

4.

the designation that areas beyond these limits be
under the administration of WODSEAC

5.

that the transfer of the Antarctic be effective
at the expiration of the Antarctica Treaty in

1991.

World Ocean Fisheries Council (WOFIC)
Operation
The functional jurisdiction of WOFIC would be two-fold:
the economic zone and the international area.

While the

rights of coastal states over the resources of the economic
zone have been maintained ipso facto by the Ocean Constitution, WOFIC would promulgate guidelines that are to be used
by coastal states.

These plans would specify the method for

quota allocation, conservation, exploitation, enforcement
and management of the various species.

The eouncil would

estimate the biomass and the maximum sustainable yield of
fisheries stocks in all economic zones.

Once these figures

have been determined, the coastal state may proceed to
issue entry permits.

Vessels fishing in areas beyond the

economic zones will continue to enjoy the freedom of
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the high seas.
World Ocean Navigation and Transportation Council (WONRAC)
Operation
IMCO would be converted into WONTRAC, integrating all
international marine
shipping.

transportation~gencies dealing

with

Selected classification societies such as the

American Bureau of Shipping, Bureau de Veritas and Lloyds
Shipping could be designated by WONTRAC to classify in their
traditional methods all ocean going vessels.

The Council

would station special inspectors at selected locations in
the functional regions to perform surveys on ships unable
to return to port of registry before the expiration of their
navigability certificates and ships drydocked for repairs.
Most accidents are caused by human error, either
through negligence or ignorance.

While individual nations

reserve the right to decide the manner in which to issue
their licenses to ship personnel, WONTRAC would require
that the licensing of all merchant marine officers be conducted through a common examination supervised at the regional Marine Centers.

The tests would be composed within

the World Ocean Management Affairs Council and list of
successful candidates would be forwarded to respective
governments of participating candidates for the issuance of
licenses.
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World Ocean Scientific and Environmental Council (WOSEC)
Operation
Coastal states would not be required to register their
research activities with WOSEC unless there is reason to
anticipate transnational effects.

The Council would supply

a guide to assist all researchers about formalities to be
adhered.
Although negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conferences
have not established the distinction between pure and applied research, I have introduced a method of research
classification as a possible solution to this issue.

Type

research would be classified as either pure or applied and
agency research as either private, national or international.

Different combinations can be established from

these classifications, but only six basic variations will
be discussed here.
Research Classification
1.

Pure private research -- WOSEC will send three
representatives

to oversee the research, one of

whom will be chosen by the receiving state.
2.

Pure national research -- The receiving state
will choose two of the four representatives from
the Council.

3.

Pure international research -- WOSEC will select
the four representatives although at the receiving
state's request one of them may be a citizen.
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4.

Applied private research -- Two representatives
will be sent by the Council and the receiving
state may send up to a maximum of ten percent of
the numerical composition of the research team
but not less than two representatives.

5.

Applied national research -- Using the Council's
gUidelines, the states may employ bilateral arrangements and may also request neutral representatives from the Council.

6.

Applied international research -- The receiving
state will sand two representatives and the four
representatives from the Council shall include an
individual from the functional region of the receiving state.

States may approve or reject only national research.
The Council would have the responsibility to use its investigative methods to ensure that the classification of
research 1s accurate and reliable.

Receiving states would

be furnished copies of reports on the research unless the
receiving state waived this right.

Research in areas be-

yond the economic zone is a freedom of the high seas, but
would be registered with the eouncil.

The Intergovern-

mental Oceanographic Commission (laC) would be the lead
agency for the marine scientific aspects of the Council.
Environment Control
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) would
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be responsible for environmental activities of WOSEC.

The

jurisdiction of WOSEC over marine pollution abatement would
extend over the oceans from the baseline of coastal states
and in special cases130 permit intervention into the internal waters.

The Council would identify sources, volumes

and localities of pollutants in the marine environment. 131
Both immediate and long term effects of pollutants amd
available financial liability instruments would be appraised.
Collected data would be used to formulate international uniform marine standards.

An international environmental

impact statement would be required of all marine activities
with transnational effects.
A program for the training of Pollution Abatement
Squads (PAS) would be included in the Regional Marine Centers.

These squads may be modeled to use the ADAPTS132 or

130Such as instances when coastal states request assistance from WOMA.
131UN, Doc. A/CONF. 48/8 1972, p. 80. Conference on
the Human Environment, Identification and Control of Pollutants of Broad International Significance.
is already
conducting worldwide collection of data on the environment.

roc

13 2Charles Koburger, Jr., "The Shadow of the Torrey
Canyon," Naval Engineers, 86(1) 1974, p. 29. ADAPTS stands
for Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer Systems. It
prevents the oil from coming in contact with the marine environment by pumping oil from a casualty tank to a safe
container.

97
any other selected systems.

They would be stationed within

functional regions and placed on the alert at all times to
combat spills.
Prevention of the marine disasters and pollution of
the marine environment will use "the totality of methods
rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency for a
given state of development in every field of human activity.133

Scientific, engineering, procedural and organi-

zational methods will be combined to erect efficient preventive actions.
World Ocean Technological and Economic Council (WOTEC)
Operation
Technology as used here means marine technology and
WOTEC would classify all nations in the following stages
of economic development:
1.

Initial

describes states that

indus~ialization--

possess little or no

technology other than that

basic to subsistence economy.
2.

Intermediate industrialization -- applies to states
whose present stage of development warrants selective and specific technological know-how.

3.

Industrialized -- to designate states capable of
exporting technology.

133Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, New York:
Vintage Books, 1964, p. 426.
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The Council would design an international code of conduct for the transfer of ocean technology.

Part of the WOMA

fund would be used to assist nations in the initial and
intermediate industrialization stages to offset additional
costs resulting from the inclusion of environmental considerations in industrial development.

Nationalization of

fully or partially foreign owned companies would be prohibited unless the nationalizing state makes due compensation as determined by WOTEC.
Countries with excess capital, such as OPEC nations,
would be encouraged to divert it to investment ventures in
initial and intermediate industrialization states.

However,

because WOTEC would guarantee such investments, the state
applicant must demonstrate political stability and pledge
to abide by the non-nationalization clause.

The Council

would specify in every detail the conditions states must
satisfy to benefit guaranteed capital and technological
transfer.

The Economic and Social Council of the UN would

be the lead agency.
World Ocean Dispute Settlement Council (WODISEC)
The World Ocean Management Authority has been designated to promote order and stability in the utilization
of collective ocean resources.

It was previously stated

that as individual states attempt to satisfy their interests,
their methods may obstruct the needs of other states, resulting in conflict.

Solutions to conflict require the
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expertise of an impartial arbitrator.
WODISEC would be the judicial arm of WOMA and would perform this aribtrator function.

The Council would have com-

pulsory and paramount jurisdiction over the adjudication of
all international oceans disputes to which judicial jurisdiction has not been granted to states or to other judicial
bodies.

The WODISEC jUdicial system will consist of nine

regional courts, nine regional appellate courts and a supreme
court.
In Chapter 6 I alluded to the fact that the notion of
ICJ compulsory jurisdiction is not generally favorably received by some nations.

As such, I have introduced regional

courts in which regional disputes may be settled.

Only

rare and multi-regional cases go to the supreme court,
which doesn't necessarily have to be the International Court
of Justice.

Moreover, the internal structure of the ICJ

would have to be reorganizetl in a manner consistent with
collective interest.

It is impossible to deal with issues

of collective concern without compulsory jurisdiction to
avoid creating sancturies for freeriders.

Although I have

used common law as the basic system, this does not preclude the use of other legal systems such as civil law.
Operation
Regional courts would settle:
- cases in law and equity arising from collective
marine related activities, ocean constitution,
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bilateral and multilateral agreements within the
economic zones of the region to which both parties
are members.
- cases in law and equity arising from disputes between
different citizens of different functional regions but
occurring within the economic zone of a region.
Appellate courts would hear cases decided by:
- regional courts whose decisions are objectionable to
one of the litigants.
The supreme

court would:

- review only multi-regional case decisions.

Multi-

regional disputes are those involving either the
economic zones of adjacent regions, states of different regions, citizens of states of different regions, or different regional economie zones.
- set guidelines and rules applicable to lower courts
and multi-regional litigations.
- examine by certiorari or to be better informed of
grave errors of lower courts and to establish
"stare decisis. ,,134
carry out judicial review in its responsibility to
interpret the ocean constitution.
Conditions for standing would be:

205

134Brandeis, "Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co.,"
393, 1932.

u.s.
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that the plaintiff is an internationally recognized
state. 1 35
- that the interest for which redemption is sought is
peculiar, results from an activity of collective
concern, and identifiable to that state alone.
- that other available peaceful settlement resources
have been exhausted with no success.
- that the interest is legally recognized and falls
within WOMA's jurisdiction.
The International Court of Justice may perform the
functions of WODISEC and be the seat of the Supreme Court.
World Ocean Management Affairs Council (WOMAC)
The World Ocean Management Affairs Council would be the
administrative and the internal operational constituent, coordinating the other councils and advisory services to the
Authority.
Operation
The coordinatiDn role require the Council to maintain
open internal and external communication channels with the
Councils, states and Conciliar • . As an advisory service, the
Council would review proposed rules, regulations and
standards submitted by states and councils and make recommendations to the Conciliar.

Administratively, the Council

135Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 3rd ed., New
York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 197 , p. 91.
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woUld keep records .aIall treaties, agreements and congressional debates.

The Council administers the Authority's

budget and collects contributions into the fund.
When the various Councils assess, review and refine
proposals for regulations or standards from states, the
final drafts are forwarded to WOMAC.

The Advisory Service

to the Authority would analyze the drafts and make recommendations to the Conciliar.

The latter includes the re-

fined drafts on the agenda of the Assembly conference.

When

the Assembly adopts the drafts, they become uniform international standards and are coded as Law of the Sea.
The preceding pages have outlined the design of the
proposed World Ocean Management Authority.

Recognizing

the magnitude of the problems associated with the efforts
states have deployed to manage the oceans and their resources, I have limited the functions and the jurisdictional
authority of WOMA to activities

of collective concern.

With this delineation as the basis for WOMA, I will now
examine its relationship to present ocean systems.
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CHAPTER 9 .

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

WOMA and Present Ocean Systems
Sovereignty, as expressed through the political and
economic policies of states, determines both the success and
the effectiveness of existing ocean regimes and the acceptability and feasibility of any new systems.
Existing ocean regimes are the base upon which WOMA is
developed and these systems have the identical objective of
the rational exploration, exploitation, conservation and
protection of the oceans.

WOMA employs the services of

existing systems and incorporates recognized states' rights.
WOMA's internal organization assimilates the functions and
operating procedures of present systems; states determine
the formulation of regulations and standards.
Resolution of Obstacles by WOMA
WOMA, however, is innovative, combines rational
states' practices, integrates marine related organizations,
and coordinates these institutions through the functional
regions.

The World Ocean Management Authority provides

the forum for states to establish uniform international
regulations and standards and address ocean activities of
collective concern.

In effect, the legislative power of

WOMA resides in the Ocean Congress.

The Triadic Voting

system would mitigate the political problem by eliminating
the possibility of dominance by anyone region.

-
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By requiring developing nations to demonstrate political stability and guarantee non-nationalization of partially or wholly foreign owned investments without making
due compensation, citizens of developed nations would be
encouraged to transfer technology.
Contribution to international financial obligations and
distribution of revenues is a difficult task, but an attempt
has been made here to provide an equitable formula.

The

method developed here is the Macroformula which combines the
nominal approach (microformula) and states marine attributes.
Through the use of this formula, developed nations would no
longer be held accountable for marine pollution costs.

The

development of the formula is explained in detail in Appendix

E.
As previously discussed, some ocean uses tend to generate extra-territorial effects, degrade the marine ecosystem
and engender conflict.

WOMA would manage and designate

such uses as activities of collective concern to be controlled by collective sovereignty a challenge for states to
demonstrate political courage.
WOMA's Acceptability
WOMA may be effective, less expensive, and capable of
removing the obstacles that have crippled existing ocean
systems, but the unanswered question is the preparedness of
the international community to accept it.

The concept of

collective interest is not new and is applied to control
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conflict of interests.

The limitation of WOMA's jurisdic-

tion to activities of collective interest to the international community would reduce resistance from those states
that would like to have complete control over their coastal
resources.
Some states such as Canada and the U.S.A., in enacting
national legislation to manage activities that I have
classified as being of collective concern, have described
their acts as interim measures pending the establishment of
international arrangements.

This indicates that while

acting indiVidually they would prefer concerted effort in
dealing with such activities.

It is a general concensus

among states that these activities should be handled internationally even if the procedure is not often specified.
In protesting the Canadian Arctic Water Pollution Control
Act, the U.S.A. and Britain indicated their preference for
an international approach.

On several occasions the Inter-

national Court of Justice has affirmed the decision that
states may not use or permit the use of their territory in
a manner as to cause material injury to other states.

The

Trail Smelter Arbitration between the U.S.A. and -Canada and
the Corfu Channel Case between Britain and Albania are a
few of the instances in which states have been held liable
for failure to meet their responsibility in the performance
of their duty over activities that fall within the classification of activities of collective interest.
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The willingness of states to invest time, manpower, and
material efforts to negotiate a comprehensive treaty of the
Law of the Sea despite the political, economic and legal
impacts of such an ocean machinery supports the conjecture
that WOMA would be accepted by the international community.
Some nations that were contacted about their opinions
on the creation of WOMA responded with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, caution and pessimism.

States like Australia,

Canada, Egypt and India expressed special interest offering
suggestions and comments.

While it would be impvoper to

insinuate or draw any conclusions from the reaction of these
states, there is no doubt that most nations of the world
would prefer concerted efforts for such activities rather
than individual national practices.

While stressing its

alliance with other developing nations in these issues,
Egypt would like to have the issue of collective interest
discussed at an international conference.
These considerations and the institution of intergovernmental organizations concerned with ocean activities,
the Law of the

Se~

and the world concern for pollution of the

human environment indicate that there is the political will
to accept WOMA as a system that would regulate collective
ocean activities.

WOMA is on the horizon and although its

creation will not be immediate its establishment will eventually become a necessity, and its acceptability inevitable.
The following recommendations are made to draw the attention of the international community to this eventuality.
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Recommendations and Conclusion
Following a brief introduction to the concept of ocean
activities of collective interest, the various ocean management systems, i.e., states' approaches, specialized marine
related arrangements and regional efforts, were explored.
An evaluation of each of these regimes revealed that states'

approaches often are inconsistent with each other, the
specialized agencies cannot function effectively becaUBe of
lack of authority and regional agreements are usually undermined by political instability.
The postulation that existing ocean regimes are unable
to deal effectively with the challenge of management of
collective ocean resources lead to a survey of alternative
approaches.

The restrictions of states' power, the sanc-

tioning of states' unilateral actions, the reinforcement of
the authority of specialized agencies, the strengthening
of regional cooperation, and the development of a centralized
regime were considered.
An example of such a centralized system is to be found

in the proposed World Ocean Management Authority.

After

a complete development of the mechanics of the system, the
following reoommendations are proposed:
that, while individual state efforts are to be encouraged, they tend to create problems with ramifications beyond their intended purposes, requiring the
establishment of uniform international standards.

The
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degree of interdependence offered by the oceans is of
the utmost importance and collective ocean affairs ought
to be handled through international collective actions.
that pending the institution of a working group to
examine the feasibility of an international ocean system
as that discussed in the preceding pages, the United
Nations General Assembly should initiate and adopt a
resolution limiting all national jurisdictional claims
over the oceans to 321.8 km. or 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the territorial waters of
coastal states are measured.
that by the same resolution, the Axis continents of the
Arctic and the Antarctic should be del cared areas of
international concern.
that the World Ocean Management Authority system developed herein should be given serious consideration
by all advocates of peace, justice and order over
ocean uses.
that the United Nations General Assembly should establish a working committee to study the prospects for
and implications of creating a World Ocean Management
Authority to deal with ocean activities of collective
interest.
that an ocean constitution should be drafted under
the auspices of the United Nations to provide that
"basic norm" from which variations in established
standards can be identified and remedied.
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The WOMA system is designed to incorporate present interests and future ones and balance them in an equitable
manner.

Exercising the powers bestowed on it by the Ocean

Constitution, the Authority would begin by limiting national
claims to the breadth of the economic zone, consistent with
the practices of states.

Enforcement would be facilitated

by the composition of the Authority and the decision-making
process which makes established standards truly international.

Modification of any uniform standard would be an

international decision.
Through the seven Councils, the system would provide:
control and preventive measures for pollution of the
marine environment, access to scientific research
information, marine technological transer, and economic cooperation.
effective utilization of contemporary technological
achievements, and equitable division of economic
benefits derived from the intennational areas.
collective solution to marine related problems,
credibility and impartiality in judicial decisions,
and for an indirect mandatory two-third majority
voting process for decision making.
The system has been designed with the awareness that
collective ocean uses will continue to be a dynamic process.

Built-in flexibility, to cope with these changes

endows the Authority with continuous growth and the ability
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to meet the challenge of management and utilization of the
ocean activities of collective interest.

The process of

incorporating new activities, adopting uniform international
standards would make WOMA a truly world ocean system in the
long run.

III

APPENDIX A:

OCEAN ACTIVITIES OF COLLECTIVE CONCERN TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Ocean uses can generally be classified as resource or
non-resource, while speculative ones constitute a special
class.

Resource use means the actual harvest, capture,

harness, or consumption of living and nonliving resources
of the oceans.

Non-resource use is one during which no

physical consumption takes place.

Speculative designates

specialized use in theoretical stages of development.

In

the following pages are outline examples of activities of
collective interest.
Resource Uses
Fisheries
For many years, protein has been extracted from
marine fisheries.

The world fisheries catch for 1975 was

69.7 metric tons~34

Not all captured fisheries are con-

sumed directly, some 50 percent are converted into fish meal
and protein concentrate for poultry and livestock.

Atti-

tudinal change over time may favor the introduction of fish
mean protein concentrate into the human diet in the impoverished areas to alleviate protein deficiency.

134UN, Atlas of Living Resources, New York: FAO, 1972.
UN, Yearbook, New York: 1975. Gulland, Fisheries Resources of the Seas.
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Manganese Nodules
Manganese Nodules are the most interesting of the ocean
sediments, black hydrous manganese oxides and cover the
floors of the three major oceans.

They were discovered

during the "Challenger" expedition and are a form of
pelagic sedimentation.
If not for their economic importance, their small volume
would render them insignificant relative to the totality of
the ocean sediments.

By taking the median of the maximum

and minimum nodules concentration for the eastern (350 b.
metric tons), central (900 b. metric tons), and western
Pacific (406 b. metric tons), it has been estimated that
1656 b. metric tons of manganese nodules are dispersed in
this ocean. 135

Manganese, Iron, Nickel, Copper, Cobalt,

and Lead are recoverable from these nodules.
Oil and Gas
In 1975, the annual world oil production reached 2712
million tons, a daily production of 54.2 million barrels or
an increase of over 152.7 percent over the 1073 million tons,
or 21.5 bbls. produced in 1960.

The distribution for oil

production for 1975 is shown in Table 4.
Approximately 493 oil fields and 287 gas field had been
discovered offshore on continental shelves of the world

135Mero, Mineral Resources of the Sea, p. 126.
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by 1973. 1 36

The fields are subdivided giant or regular.

A

giant gas field has been defined as one containing more than
3500 billion cubic ft. of recoverable gas and a giant oil
field as one containing more than 500 million barrels of
estimated recoverable oil.
less than these figures.

Regular field contain volumes
There are presently in the world,

10 giant gas fields, 277 regular field, 187 giant oil fields
and 29,813 regular oil fields. 137 Fig. 5 depicts the
locations of giant oil fields.
Energy is an issue of great importance to most governments and the designers of national policies are concerned
about their individual national reserves and the world
energy potential as a whole.

Table 5 shows the provisional

recoverable reserves of oil and gas in millions of barrels
from the various regions 1 38 of the world.
Non-Resource Uses
Overflight
r

Aircraft continually fly over the oceans.

The atmos-

phere directly above the oceans is the medium that facilitates overflights and if current jurisdictional claims were

136E. N• Tiratsoo, Oil Fields of the World, Great
Britain: Creative Press Ltd., 1973, p. 33.
137Ibid.
138Henry L. Berryhill, Jr., "The Wide World Search for
Petroleum Offshore," Department of Interior, Washington,
D.C.: Geological Survey Circular No. 694, 1974.
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TABLE 3.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF OIL PRODUCTION IN 1975

Region
Africa
Eastern Europe
Far East and
Australia
Mid-East
North America
South America
Western Europe
Total

TABLE 4.

onshore
Percentage

Offshore
Percentage

514 x 10 6

84.7
97.0

15.3
3.0

107 x 10 6
983 x 10 6

63.6
81.5

36.4
18.5

85.0
55.8
80.0
78.2

15.0
44.2
20.0
21.8

Production
Metric tons
227 x 10 6

559
222
23.8
2635.8

x
x
x
x

106
10 6
10 6
10

OIL AND GAS POTENTIAL ESTIMATED RESERVES ON A
REGIONAL BASIS

Region
Africa
Asia
Europe
Mid-East
Oceania
Central America
North America
South America
Total

Oil in Metric Tons

31,250 x 106
20,410 x 10 6
37,820 x 106
116,500 x 106
400 x 10 6
6,650 x 106
41,200 x 106
16,600 x 10 6
270,830 x 106

Gas in Barrels
18000 x 10 6
17640 x 10 6
63530 x 106
26300 x 106
3500 x 106
39500 x 106
168470 x 10 6

Data in Tables 4 and 5 are compiled from Henry Berryhill,
and UN, Petroleum P~Djections for the 1970s, ST/ECA!179,
1974.

o

o
oVI

-.......
D

o

(p

..
u
...

Ql
;:)

o

'"

o

c
'"
.....
W
L4.

.....

o

u..

o
z
o

....

«

0 0

o
I)

o

u

o.....

o

o
.0

•

tJ°
o
o

o

o

o

o

o

0

o

&:?~

0

0

115
ever projected into the air-space above the oceans, the
aviation industry might be seriously handicapped.
Marine Transportation
Although navigation is often considered to be synonymous with marine transporation, there is an important
distinction between the two.

Navigation is the process of

directing the movement of a ship, or any craft from one
point to another.

To accomplish this task, the navigator

may use piloting, dead reckoning, electronic
navigation.

or celestial

Marine transportation or shipping, is the ap-

plication of these four techniques to move goods or services from place of origin to destination.
The World Merchant Fleet grew from 286.7 million gross
tons in 1973 to 372 millions in 1976.

The estimated dead-

wight tonnage or the carrying capacity of the fleet rose
from 447.5 millions in 1972 to 601.2 million tons in 1976,
an annual increase of 9.4 percent for that period. 139
Table 6 shows the distribution of the world fleet by type
of vessel in 1976.
Communication
The oceans offer, perhaps, one of the most natural
media for communication.

It can be argued that the ra-

tionale for Grotius" emphasis on "mare Iberum" was
139 Ni cholas Blenkey, "World Shipping," Marine
Engineer/Log, LXXII (7), (June 15, 1977), p. 96.

TABLE 6.

SUMMARY OF THE WORLD FLEET BY VESSEL TYPE, December 31, 1976

Freighters:
Gere ral Cargo
Full Containerships
Partial Containerships
Roll-on/Roll-off Vessels
Barge Carriers
Total
Tankers:
Petroleum (crude and products)
L.P.G.
L.N.G.
Other specalized tankers
Total
Bulk Carriers:
General Bulk Carriers
Ore/Oil Carriers
Ore Carriers
Bulk/Oil Carriers
Bulk/Car Carriers
Other Specialized Bulkers
Total
Passenger Carriers:

Miscellaneous
Total

Number

Gross
Tons

11,584
508
597
205
29
12,923

63,658
7,566
4,822
1,094
799
77,939

88,462
7,362
6,458
1,358
999
104,639

4,658
248
40
437
5,383

172,442
2,277
1,572
2,825
179,116

327,241
2,674
1,266
4,419
335,600

3,038
278
102
67
114
572
70
4'110

54,322
15,559
6,401
3,962
2,000
5,550
95,451
5,697

91,801
27,770
11,874
7,368
3,170
8,020
163,2
2,9 2

23,586

358,203

606,499*

13,797
372,000

23,361**
629,860

t

08

24,94

*Source: Marad, u.S. Department of Commerce
**Source: Lloyds Register

Deadweight
Tons

g8

I--'
I--'
0"\
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actually for freedom of communication.

Distant lands are

linked by ocean lanes for commercial transactions.
Landbased communication systems such as telephone,
telegraph, telex and private lines use cables layed on the
ocean floor or in buoys in the water columns of the oceans.
Today, international communication is one of the fastest
growing industries in the world.

Satellites flying over the

oceans relay information instantly linking capitals, ships
and airplanes.
Scientific Research
Efforts of devoted scientists have unveiled the
geological, chemical and biological composition of the
oceans.

The data and information accumulated thus far have

facilitated resources development, improved marine technology, and increased understanding of oceanic processes indispensable for the protection of the marine environment.
Dumping
Dumping is any deliberate disposal into the oceans
of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms
or other man-made structures.

The unfortunate inclusion of

dumping as an ocean use is a contradiction perpetuated by
the inconsistencies in states' practices and tantamount
to sanctioning pollution of the marine environment.
Weather
Weather can be viewed from two perspectives:
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1.

The effects of man's activities on the oceans and
how they may affect climatic conditions.

2.

Actual use of the oceans for the purpose of weather
prediction or modification.

These two perspec-

tives have been instrumental in placing a greater
emphasis on the importance of gaining an increased
understanding of climatic changes.
Climate has been defined as the average of the
various weather elements usually taken over a thirty year
period.

A practical definition is the concept of a

"climatic" state which is the average, including variability
and other statistics, of the complete set of atmospheric,
hydrospheric and cryospheric variables over a specified
period of time in a specified domain of the earth. 1 40
Weather modification is defined as a chemical inbalance of these variables in a climatic state due to unnatural causes.

The exchange of heat, moisture and mo-

mentum between air and sea account for the oceans' dominant
influenee on the climatic state.

An understanding of these

dynamic and energetic processes would ameliorate the relationship between man and the oceans and minimize adverse
effects of man's activities upon the marine environment.
Military
While there is often opposition in some forums
140NAS, Understanding Climatic Change, Washington,
D.C.: National Atmospheric Society, 1975, p. 11.
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against including military use as an ocean use, the presen~e

of the military will be required to meet current

greater zonal control over the ocean and their resources.
The role of the military at sea would include:
Stragetic nuclear deterrence, the maintenance of
nuclear weapon strike capability, by those nations
that have these weapons to prevent potential nuclear
nations from launching pre-emptive nuclear assaults.
The deployment and positioning of deterrent weapons
can be carried out by sea-based nuclear submarinial
carrier-based bombers, or strategic air command.
A specific area of the ocean may be tomporarily
controlled for a specified time in order to project military
power ashore through landing or amassing of forces.

Naval

presence is often used in peace time to achieve political
objectives through coercision short of open war.

In a

general war situation, the gravity of events make it imperative to intercept enemy supplies, disrupt enemy shipping
through blockade, or actual participation in combat by adversary forces.
In addition to this traditional role, deployment of
naval vessels for policing commercial ships; enforcement
of regulations; protection of natural resources, crew,
fishermen; and raw material transportation could become
an important peaceful use of men of war.

141 J ohn A. Knaus, "The Military Role in the Ocean
and its Relation to the Law of the Sea," The Law of the
Sea Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference of the Law
of the Sea Institute, Kingston, Rhode Island: University of
Rhode Island, June 21-24, 1971, p. 78.
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Speculative or Specialized Uses
The term speculative or specialized is used to describe any ocean use whose application is either in a
theoretical stage of development, economically infeasible,
or beyond the capability of present technology.
Seamounts
On the abyssal plain of the ocean floor, elevations
rise at times to heights of 914 m. called seamounts.

When

they have flat tops, they are known as guyots or tablemounts.
These mounts are used for fisheries and mineral resource
recovery, military operations and underwater anchorage. 142
Fresh Water from Icebergs
A significant number of nations have inadequate
supplies of fresh water.

It has been suggested that nuclear

powered "super tugs" could be used to tow these icebergs
offshore where they could be melted and pumped to shore.
Saudi Arabia recently created an Iceberg Transportation
Company Ltd. to ascertain a viable means of towing Antarctic icebergs to the port of Jeddah on the Red Sea, a distance of 11,270 km. 143

142"Project Sea Use: Exploration of Cobb Seamount,"
A Critical Look at Marine Technology, Washington, D.C.:
Oceanographic Commission, 1968, p. 205
143"He Is Not Kidding!", Ocean Science News :(.9(41)
(Oct. 17, 1977):5.
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Floating Airports
This idea has been in existence since 1934 and it is
gaining support now due to dense population concentrations
in areas where airports are typically located.

Safety

f?ctors and space limitations explain the serious consideration currently being given to this idea.
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APPENDIX B.

BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND FISHING
ZONES OF INDEPENDENT COASTAL STATES

""-

Country

Territorial Sea

Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
China, People's Republic of
China, Republic of
Columbia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Benin (Dahomey)
Denmark
Greenland
Faeroes
Djibuti
Domincan Republic
Eucador
EgyPt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Germany, Democratic Republic of
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Greece

15

12
20
200
3
3
3
12
3
3
200
12
12
12
18
12
12
3
12
3
12
12
30
12
12
12
12
3
3
3
12
6
200
12
200
12
12
12
12
12
100
50
3
3
200
6

Fishing Zone
12
12
200
200
12
12
3
200
3
12
200
12
12
12
18
12
200
200
12
12
12
12
30
200
3
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
200
12
200
12
12
12
12
200
100
50
200
200
200
6
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Country
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Madggascar
Malaysia
Maidives
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritus
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Mozambique
Nauru
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Poland

Territorial Sea
3
12
200
150
12
12
12
4
12
12
12
12
3
6
12
12
12
12
3
12
12
12
12
No legislation
12
12
50
12
2.77-55.0
6
30
12
12
12
12
12
12
3
12
3
'30
4
12
12
200
12
200
0.300
12

Fishing Zone
3
200
200
150
200
200
12
200
200
12
50
12
200
6
12
200
12
200
3
12
12
200
12
6
200
12
150
12
100-150
20
36
200
200
12
70
200
12
12
200
200
30
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
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Country

Territorial Sea

Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Soviet Union**
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam
Sweden
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
(Black Sea)
United Arab Emirates
(Shariah)
United Kingdom
Others
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Western Samoa
¥emen ~Aden~
Yemen Sana
Yugoslavia
Zaire

12

3

Fishing Zone
200

3

12
6
12
150
12
200
3
200
12
12
12
12
12
12
4
12
50
12
12

12
12
12
200
200
200
3
200
200
200
12
12
200
12
200
12
50
12
200

12
12
6
12
3
12
3
3
3
200
12
12
12
12
12
10
12

12
12
12

3
12
200
3
200
200
200
12
12
200
12
12
12

*Archipelago or Modified Archipelago Baseline Concept
**Includes Ukranian SSR
Source:

Office of the Geographer, U.S. State Department.
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APPENDIX C.
I.

LISTING OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL MARINE
ARRANGEMENTS

Fisheries Conservation and Management
A.

FAO-Sponsored

1. Regional Fisheries Advisor¥ Commission for the
Southwest Atlantic (CARPAS)
2. Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central
Atlantic (CECAF)
3. General Fisheries CouncIl for the Mediterranean (GFCM)
4. Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC)
5. Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council (IPFC)
6. Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC)
B. Independent
7. Baltic Sea Salmon Standing Committee (BSSSC)
8. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
9. International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC)
10. International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
11. International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF)
12. International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF)
13. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC)
14. International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC)
15. International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (IPSFC)
16. International Whaling Commission (IWC)
17. Japan-China Joint Fisheries Commission (JCFC)
18. Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission (JKFC)
19. Japanese-Soviet Northwest Pacific Fisheries
Commission (JSFC)
20. Mixed Commission of 1962 (Baltic Sea) (MC)
21. Mixed Commission for Black Sea Fisheries (MCBSF)
22. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)
23. North Pacific Fur Seal Commission (NPFSC)
24. Permanent Commission of the Conference on the Use
and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the
South Pacific (PCSP)
25. Sealing Commission for the Northeast Atlantic (SCNEA)
26. Sealing Commission for the Northwest Atlantic (SCNWA)
27. Shellfish Commission for the SkagerrakKattegat (SCSK)
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II.
A.

Scientific Research
10C-Sponsored
28. Co-operative Study of the Kruoshio and Adjacent
Regions (CSK)
29. Co-operative Investigations in the Mediterranean (CIM)
30. Co-Operative Investigations of the Northern Part
of the Eastern Central Atlantic (CINECA)
31. Southern Oceans Survey (SOC)
32. Regional Investigation of the El Nino
Phenomenon (ERFEN)
33. IDOE: Environmental Forecating Program
25a. Investigation of the Subtropical Convergence in
the Southwest Atlantic Ocean
33b. Investigation of the Equatorial Undercurrent of
the Western Pacific
33c. Sea Surface Current Project
33d. North Pacific Experiement (NORPAX)
33e. International Southern Ocean Studies (ISOS)
33L Monsoon Circulation Experiement (MONEX)
33~ Joint Air-Sea Interaction Program (JASIN)
33h. Joint North Sea Wave Project tJONSWAP)
33~ Overflow Studies
33j. Mid-Ocean Dynamics Experiment and Test
Area (POLYMODE)
34. IDOE: Environmental Quality Program
34a. Pollutant Transfer
34b. Geochemical Ocean Sections Study (GEOSECS)
34c. Saronikos Gulf Pollution Study
34d Eontrolled Ecosystems Pollution Experiment (CEPEX»
34e. Pollution/Ecology Studies
35. IDOE: Seabed Assessment Program
35a. Southeast Atlantic Margins
35b. Southwest Atlantic Margins
35c~ FrenCh-American Mid-Ocean Undersea Study (FAMOUS)
35d. Plate Tectonics and Metallogenesis (Nazca Plate)
35e. Manganese Nodules Project
36. IDOE: Living Resources -- Assessment and
Ecology Program
36a. Coastal Upwelling Ecosystems Analysis (CUEA)
36b. Seagrass Ecosystem Study (SES)
37. LEPOR Programmes, not Part of IDOE
37a. Variability of the Sea Furface Temperature
and Salinity Fields of the South-West Pacific
and Indian Ocean
37h Study of North Sea Pollution
37c. Studies of Organic Sedimentary Processes on
Shelves, Slopes and the Deep Ocean Floor of the
South-West Pacific
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37d. Assessment of the Living Resources in the
North Atlantic
37e. Fish Stock Assessment in the South Atlantic
38. International Tsunami Warning System in the
Pacific (ITSU)
39. IOC Association for the Caribbean and Adjacent
Regions (IOCARIBE)
B.

Independent

40. International Council for the Exploration of the

Sea (ICES)
41. International Commission for the Scientific
Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea (ICSEM)
42. Federation of the Institutions Concerned with the
Study of the Afiriatic Sea (FICSAS)

III.

Environmental Control
43. Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, 1969
44. Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden Concerning Co-operation in Measures to Deal
with Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Nordic Agreement), 1971
45. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1974
46. Convention on the Protection of the Environment
between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 1974.
47. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea against Pollution (Mediterranean Action Plan),
1976.

IV.

Military

48. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
in Latin American (Treaty of Tlateloco), 1967
49. Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace, 1971

V.

Regional Development

50. Indian Ocean Fishery Survey and Development

Programme
51. Develppment of Fisheries in the Eastern Central
Atlantic
52. Development of Fisheries in the Western Central
Atlantic
53. South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating Programme (Phase II)
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54. Caribbean Fisheries Training and Development
Centre
55. Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting
for Mineral Resources in Asian Off-Shore Areas
(CCOP)
56. Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting
for Mineral Resources in Somth Pacific Off-Shore
Areas (CCOP/SOPAC)
Others
57. Antarctic Treaty, 1959
58. European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National
Territories, 1965
59. Statement of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
on the Malacca Straits, 16 November 1971
Global Conventions and Treaties with Regional Implications
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution bf the Sea by Oil, 1954
International Convention Relating to Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field
of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, 1971
International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1971
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Ships, 1962
Convention ~nr the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London
Convention), 1972
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention),
1974
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, 1963
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1971
Source: From Alexander, Regional Arrangements in Ocean
Affairs.

APPENDIX D.

WORLD MARINE POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION: CLASSIFIED AS COASTAL, INSULAR,
AND LANDLOCKED STATES AND SPECIAL STATUS TERRITORIES
COASTAL STATES

Ccnuntry
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China ('PRC)
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eq. Guinea
Ethopia
Finland
France

Area km2
28748
2381743
1251513
2776480
143998
30513
112622
8510000
110912
676581
520269
9976100
756280
956961
1138300
342000
50700
43031
283600
1000000
20935
28102
1222500
377032
551208

Shelf km2
3840
107.00
65756
1030000
38400
4100
3100
610000
11963
250000
12920
935000
185000
48365
8600
13200
84000
25450
53600
16770
10500
60350
75500
20450

Coastline km

Pop. in
000

418
.118 3
1600
3926
580
63
120
7725
378
2278
402
20611
5300
14500
2952
156
1228
7438
850
2420
304
380
1011
1361
2543

16766
6050
25384
76815
10055
3111
107145
8722
31240
7120
22831
10253
838803
24717
1345
1968
5045
6733
37233
4007
318
27946
4735
52913

24B2

GNP
$M
1250
11100
4295
37380
7910
55430
370
95920
15420
2910
1760
139260
8680
244640
11640
610
1610
32470
3310
10210
1590
90
2660
22030
285780

In/Cap $
530
730
710
1520
100
5670
120
920
1780
100
250
6190
830
300
500
470
840
6430
480
280
410
290
100
4700
5440
I-'

N

~

(

Country
Gabon
Gambia
Germany D.
Germany F.
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bis.
Guyana
Honduras
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Italy
Ivory C.
Jordan
Kampuchea
Kenya
Korea N.
Korea S.
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco

Area km 2 Shelf km 2
267000
11295
108178
248456
238537
131944
108889
245857
36125
215000
112088
3129316
1623930
434934
20764
301200
322455
96610
181000
582650
121597
98477
1600
10400
111370
1759500
332996
1082620
1969269
2
444962

35400
3700
28560
49000
23700
57000
14615
50180
48550
48700
414868
108950
2000
3250
120740
12200
20
40000
6500
220200
7200
18400
55000
418000
33920
368000
228
60000

Coastline km
739
70
901
570
528
15000
330
li50
274
430
693
6536
1833
50
230
4539
500
26
435
500
2495
1319
213
225
537
1685
3432
667
10219
4
1600

Pop. in
000
620
574
16920
62040
9866
8962
6199
4416
525
791
3037
598097
33105
11124
3371
55810
4916
2688
8110
13399
15443
33100
996
3065
1708
2444
11900
1318
60145
24
17504

GNP
$M

In/Cap

1030
90
62710
388670
4130
18830
3060
630
210
390
950
80410
41440
12000
11630
156510
2930
1120
570
2610
5980
15980
9330
3290
580
10430
7910
380
63050

1960
170
3710
6260
430
2090
580
120
390
500
340
140
1250
1110
3460
2820
460
430
70
200
390
480
10030
107-0
390
4430
680
290
1090

7070

430

I

~

VJ

0

(

(

Country
Mozambiqu"e
Netherland
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Poland
Portugal Qatar
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leon
Singapore
Somalia
S. Africa
U.S.S.R.
Spain
Sudan
Surinam
Sweden
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
U.A. Emirate
U. S. A.

Area km 2

783030
36600
139699
932773
386270
212457
803945
75835
1284640
312677
91971
11000
23'P500

2149690
196063
72326
586
637657
1221037
22402000
504800
2505825
163265
449750
184480
939703
514000
56600
164150
780576
603700
- ~600

936M05

Shelf km 2

Coastline km

Bop. in
000

GNP

$M

In/Cap

165295
1160
16500
395000
1200
77300
51390

718
406
140
2950
2881
42800
2767
717
386
2862
175
750
2584
48
1030
3558

9239
13653
2155
73044
4007
766
70260
168
15839
34015
9009
190
21178
8966
4136
2983
2250
3170
25471
254300
35472
17757
422
8195
7355
15155
4186:9
2222
5772
39180

3030
71120
1360
20810
23360
1250
8760
1610
11110
84660
14650
1380
23080
22670
1590
540
4970
290
30180
598640
87250
3460
460
59100
3990
2320
12670
550
2560
29460

340
5250
670
280
5860
1660
130
1000
740
2510
1630
7240
1100
2830
330
190
2240
90
1210
2380
2490
230
1180
7240
560
160
310
250
650
750

41520
1700000

1448
21576

548
213631

6060
1413530

11060
6670

63200
75500
37934
155000
42720
55000
45952
82800
40000
28150
18480
25000

367
755
669
3056
2092
885
1813
2330
524
1710
563
210

23770
24800
956
45000
100320
1700000
74700
9800

~

f-J

'vJ

f-J

Country
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen ~S~
Yeman A
Yugoslavia
Zaire

Area km 2
177508
912068
328734
332968
195000
255804
2346201

Shelf km 2
39600
90650
382720
20255
17700
43500
1148

Coastline km

Pop. in
000

GNP

660
2813
3444
1550
452
789
41

3064
11993
44155
1657
6668
21325
24902

3290
22780
6150
360
1160
27820
3530

$M

In/Cap $
1190
1960
150
220
180
1310
150

I--'
\>J

I\)

2.
Country
Australia
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Cape Verde
China (Roc)
Comoros
Cuba
Cyprus
Dominican
Fiji
Grenada
Haiti
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Jamaica
Japan
Madagascar
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius
Nauru
N. Zealand
N. Guinea
Philippine
Sao Tome P
Seychelles
Sri Lanka

Area km
7700000
13935
622
430
4033
35339
2171
110922
9251
48734
18272
344
27750
102846
1907568
70285
11430
369700
587041
298
316
1865
21
268676
461691
300000
964
237
65610

INSULAR STATES
Shelf km 2
2000000
320
56400
70000
2500
8950
15000
3500
111000
1382000
145000
3250
233000
5845
1630
212000
184600
27800

Coastline km2
20000
3542
161
90
965
990
340
6100
537
1350
322
1082
2000
36834
1228
519
8967
4828
644
180
170
24
5400
5152
17460
209
491
1200

Pop. in
000
13507
204
256
257
294
16100
306
9090
639
4697
577
108
4867
216
130597
3127
2029
110953
8020
119
328
899
7
3087
2716
42513
80
58
13986

GNP
$M

In/Cap $.

71080
490
580
290
140
12710
60
6480
850
2960
470
40
7-50
1200
21780
7170
2390
446026
1570
10
390
510

5330
2460
2350
1200
470
810
230
710
1320
650
840
330
170
5430
170
2320
1190
4070
180
100
1220
580

13070
1250
12670
40
30
1760

4310
470
330
570
520
130

I---'
'vJ
'vJ

Country
Tonga
Trin. Tob.
U.K.
w. Samoa

2
Area kID
702
5172
244000
2946

2 CoastShelf kID line kID
20400
486000

470
10509
403

Pop. in
000
93
~066

55962
155

GNP
$M
30
1810
200830
50

In/Cap $
300
1700
3590
300

I-'
I.J.J

+-

(

3.
Country
Alfghanistan
Andorra
Austria
B. Russia
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Burundi
C.A. Emp.
Chad
Czech.
Hungary
~aos

Lesotho
Liechtenstein
Luxemburg
Mali
Mongolia
Nepal
Ni~er

Paraguay
Rwanda
San Marino
Swazi:land
Switzerland
Uganda
Upper .volt
Vatican City
Zambia

Area km 2
647497
468
83849
207600
4700
1098581
600372
27834
622984
1284000
127869
93030
2;36800
30355
159
2586
1204021
1565000
140797 .
1267000
406752
26338
62
17363
41447
235887
274122
0.4
752000

LANDLOCKED STATES
Shelf km 2

-

-

Coastline km

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Pop.in
000
19280
22
7523
1173
5634
677
3765
1784
4030
14802
10539
3303
1039
2200
360
5697
1446
12572
4600
2647
4198
19
494
6481
6481
6032
1000
4896

GNP

$M

In/Cap

$

1880

110

33310

4410

80
1550
190
330
370
410
48860
22810
220
170

70
280
290
90
210
100
3330
2180
70
140

2180
450
860
1250
540
1270
310

6050
80
610
100
120
510
80

190
50680
2700
. 520

390
7870
240
90

2470

520
I-'
\..>J
\J1
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4.
Territory

AREAS OF SPECIAL

ST~TUS

Area km 2

American Samoa
198
Antigua
445
Ashmore and Cartier Islands
5
Belize
22,965
Bermuda
55
Bouvet Island
57
Br. Indian Ocean Territory
78
Brunei
5,788
Canton and Enderbury Island
70
242
Cayman Island
Christmas Island Indian Ocean
135
Cocos Island
13
Cook Island
242
Coral Sea Island Territory
2.6
Dominica
754
Faeroe Island
1,399
16,718
Falkland Island
French Guieana
86,151
400
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctica410,472
Gibraltar
5
686
Gilbert Island
2,184,000
Greenland
1,748
Guadeloupe
Guam
543
Guernsey
73
291
Heard and McDonald Island
1,035
Hong Kong
Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral
Zone
3,533
374
Jan Mayen
117
Jersey
2.6
Johnson Atoll
16
Macoa
590
Isle of Man
1,121
Martinque
Midway Island
5
135
Monserrat
Navassa Island
5
824
Netherlands Antilles
22,225
New Caledonia
14,280
New Hebrides
260
Niue
34
Norfolk Island
Pacific Island, Trust
1,786
Terr±.tory

Population
31,000
70,000
126,000
55,000
2,000
144,000
11,000
3,000
618
19,000
74,000
70,000
2,000
58,000
124,000
29
27,000
52,000
49,000
394,000
97,000
51,485
4,045,000

72,692
1,007
266,000
56,000
358,000
2,220
12,000
238,000
122,000
93,000
5,000
2,000
115,000

:l.37
Territory
Panama Canal Zone
Paracel Island
Pitcairn Island
Portuguese Timor
Puerto Rico
Reunion
St. Christoopher Nevis Anguilla
st. Helen
St. Lucia
St. Pierre and Miquelon
St. Vincent
Solomon Island
Southwest Africa (Namibia
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)
Spanish North Africa
Spratly Island
Svalbard
Tokelau Island
Turks and Caicos Island
Tuvalu
USA Misceallaneous Island
Virgin Islands, UK
Virgin Islands, USA
Wake Island
Wallis and Futuna

Area km 2

Population

1,438

46,000

19,583
8,931
2,522
307
398
619
242
650
29,900
827,479
390,866
36

82
658,000
3,045,000
490,000
65,000
5,000
107,000
5,000
94,000
185,000
862,000
6,100,000
166,000

- 47

62,288
10
432
26
13
130
346
8
276

4,000
2,000
6,000
6,000
11,000
65,000
1,647
9,000

Compiled from the following sources: UN, Fishery Country
Profile, New York, FAO, 1975; UN, World Bank Atlas,
Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1976; UN, Student Map of the
United Nations, New York, UN, 1976; UN, Non-Self Governing Territories, New York, UN, 1960.
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APPENDIX E.

THE MACROFORMULA FOR DISTRIBUTION AND CONTRIBUTION OF REVENUES

The Microformula section of the Macroformula is
based upon the hypotheses that:
a correlation exists between the income per capita
of a nation and its material well being, economic
development and ability to discharge financial
obligations.
the income per capita is a microcosmic representation of the viability of a nation.
The Macroformula however, assumes that:
in some countries where direct real products are used
to determinE

the income per capita instead of pur-

chasing power parities, the prices of goods not
entering the international markets are discarded.
over estimation or distortion would be a possible
source of error if only the income per capita were
used in the formula.
the wealth of the world is n0t evenly distributed and
the burden of contribution and/or distribution of
revenues must take into consideration the income per
capita, GNP, population, and marine attributes such
as land area, shelf area, and coastline.
Explanation of terms
1.

Income (Y) is income per capita

2.

Economic Discrepancy Coefficient (EDC) is the
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ratio between the mean income per capita and the
income range for the group considered.

Mathema-

tically, EDC = Y/AY, where, Y = group mean income
and 6Y

= Yl - YO = income range.

3. State Comparative Advantage Ratio (SCAR) is the
ratio of the individual state's income to the group
mean income.

SCAR = Ys/Y

4. Adjustment Factor (AF) is the product of the economic
discrepancy coefficient and the individual state's
comparative advantage ratio, or the ratio between the
individual state's income per capita to the group
income range.

AF = EDC.SCAR

= Y/llY.Ys/Y

= Ys/bY
5. The characteristics of individual member's land area,
shelf area, coastline, population and gross national
product are substituted chronologically for (Y) in
steps one through four to determine their individual
(AP) .

6. AF attributes (AFA) is the mean of' the AFs of the
6.:ther__ five attributes.

7. AF composite (AFC) is the average of the income AF
and the attributes AF.AFC = (AFy + AFA)/2
8. Estimated unadjusted Value (EV) is the ratio of the
amount to be shared and/or contributed divided by
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the number in the group.

EV

= piN where, P =

amount and N = # in group.

9. Discrepancy value

(D~is

the product of the ad-

justment factor and the estimated unadjusted value.
DV = AFC.EV

=

Yc~Y

.p/N where, Yc is individual attributes
for each member.

10. Equity Factor (EF) is the difference between the

estimated unadjusted value and the discrepancy value.
EF = EV-DV

= piN - AFC(P/N)
= 1 - AFC
11 . Total Receipts are the amount to be received by each

beneficiary in the group.

TR = EF + DV
= (1 - AF) +

DV

wtiere, DV is the mean of the group discrepancy
values

L=

n

DVi

i=O N

12.

Total Contributions are the payments to be made by
each member of the group.

TC = DV + EF where, EF

is the mean of the group equity factors.
n

~o EF1~
Testing the Macroformula
Eleven nations have been carefully selected from
Appendix D.

These nations represent either coastal,

insular, landlocked, developed, developing, rich, poor, or
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the functional regions.
Procedure for calculations
1.

N = 11

2.

P = $60,500

3.

EV = $5,500

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Y = 11,060 - 100 = $9960
AFY = Ys/$9960
Size

= 22,402,000 - 11,430 = 22,390,570 km2

AFSize = S6/22,390,570 km 2
Shelf = 2;000;000 - 0 ~ .2,OQOrOOO.km2
AFShelf = Ms/2,000,000 km 2
Cline = 42,800 km - 0 = 42,800 km
AFCline

=

CL s/42,800 km

Population

= 838,803,000 - 948,000 = 838,255,000

AFPop = Pops/838,255,000
GNP

= 1,413,530 - 410 = $1,413,120M

15.

AFGNP = GNPs/$1,413,120M

16.

AFA = (AFS + AFM + AFCL + AFPOP + AFGNP)/5

17.

AFC = (AFY + AFA)/2

The computed results are given in Table 6.

It can be seen

from these computations that, whereas the comparative advantage of the USA over Chad is 58:1 (from AFC-USA/AFCChad, 0.638/0.011), their computed receipts is only 1:2
($3576.5/$7025) in favor of Chad.

Their contributions

are approximately 1.9:1 ($7423.5/$3975) in favor of Chad.

TABLE 6.

COMBUTATIONS FOR TOTAL RECEIPTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH OF THE
FOLLOWING STATES

AFY

AFA

Australia
Brazil
Chad

0.535
0.092
0.010

0.375
0.212

China
France
Jamaica
Nigeria

0.301
0.546
0.119
0.028

state

AFC

DV

0.013

0.455
0.153
0.011

2505.2
841.5
60.5

0.366
0.072
0.004
0.036

0.333
0.309
0.061
0.032

1831.5
1699.5
335.5
176.0

P..o J,and

0.252

0.029

0.141

775.5

U.A. Emirates

1.110

U.S.A.
U.S.S.R.

0.670

0.013
0.605
0.715

0.561
0.638
0.477

3085.5
3509.0
2623.5

Total

0.239

-DV

EF

EF

TR

2997.5
4658.5

4583.0
6244.0

5439.5
3668.5
3800.5
5164.5
l!"\
gj 53240.

7025.0

.

.
..::t

l!"\

(j\

~

4724.5
2414.5
19910.
2876.5

l!"\
~

r<\

5254.0
5386.0
6750.0
6909.5

TC
6417.0
4756.0
3975.0
5746.0
5614.0
4250.0
4090.5

6310.0

4690.0

4000.0

flOOO.O

3576.5
4462.0

7423.5
6538.0

$60,500. $60,500.

I--'

+:I\J
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